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Abstract 
 
The main problem addressed in animal ethics is on what grounds 
and to what extent we owe animals moral consideration.  I argue that 
many animals deserve direct moral consideration in virtue of their 
agency, selfhood and autonomy. 
 I start by providing an account of agency and selfhood that admits 
of degrees, from minimal to complex, among animal species that is 
supported by current research on consciousness and the mental 
capacities of animals.  I posit that agency and selfhood are morally 
valuable as they allow for subjective mental experiences that matter to 
conscious individuals. 
 I then develop a view of autonomy that corresponds to my view of 
agency and selfhood, whereby the degree to which an individual is self-
aware indicates the degree to which that being is autonomous.  I argue 
that autonomy not only consists in the rational and reflective capacities 
of humans, but also at a more minimal level where autonomy is simply 
the ability to make choices.  I support this view of autonomy as choice 
with an account of ‘naturalized autonomy’ and explain some of the 
implications of this view for animals. 
 After considering the views of Peter Singer, Tom Regan and 
Bernard Rollin on animal ethics, I analyze the flaws in their reasoning and 
argue that my own view provides a stronger account for the direct moral 
consideration of animals.  This is due to my inclusion of agency, selfhood 
and autonomy, which these philosophers mainly neglect. 
  I review some current reinterpretations of Kant’s moral arguments 
that claim animals ought to be considered ends-in-themselves.  I present 
reasons why the inclusion of selfhood would strengthen this claim and 
further develop my argument for respecting the autonomy of animals. 
 I conclude that a theory of animal ethics based on agency, selfhood 
and autonomy provides the strongest account for the direct moral 
consideration of animals, as it is empirically informed and provides a 
moral middle path between animal welfare and animal rights. 
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Introduction 
 
 Despite the increase in awareness of the welfare of animals1 in 
western culture, animals are still treated, by and large, merely as 
resources for human use.  Practices such as factory farming, 
entertainment and scientific experimentation on animals demonstrate a 
general view of animals as objects rather than as subjective individuals 
with the capacity for experiences and interests.  Even though many 
people adore their pets and treat them with affection and care, these 
same people can dismiss the cruel treatment of animals in other ways as 
unimportant or irrelevant to them.  Midgley describes this sort of person 
as an “…absolute dismisser…” who “…takes the exclusion of animals 
from serious concern as something obvious and established.  Against this 
background, any sympathy or regard that we may choose to pay to some 
of them counts as something of an optional fancy, not any sort of duty.”2  
This inconsistency in how we treat animals can be considered a result of 
the belief that there is a categorical divide between the moral value of 
humans and other animals.  Theories of animal ethics tend to focus on 
the question of which morally relevant features are shared between 
humans and other animals, and my view follows this trend by attempting 
to answer two main questions:   
                                                
1 Throughout my thesis, for the sake of brevity, I will refer to nonhuman animals 
2 Midgley, Mary.  1983.  Animals and Why They Matter.  Athens:  The University 
of Georgia Press.  p. 17. 
 2 
1.  Do we owe animals direct moral consideration, and if so, on 
what grounds? 
 2.  To what extent do we owe animals direct moral consideration? 
 When we talk of direct moral obligations towards other humans, we 
often include the consideration of rights and personhood as paramount.  
However, my focus will be on the moral obligations we have towards 
animals, without entering into the legal and political debate regarding 
rights and personhood.  This is because while these are important 
concepts, moral obligations do not necessarily imply rights.  I will take 
the view of Lomasky when he writes that, “Rights establish moral 
constraints that must not be violated, but one who never violates a right 
might nonetheless show himself to be thoroughly wicked.  To do what is 
right and to do what is demanded by rights should not be conflated.”3  
This is important as within the field of animal ethics, the rights position 
is seen to be in opposition to the animal welfare position.  While animal 
rightists often adopt an abolitionist view on the use of animals, and 
animal welfarists believe it is acceptable to use animals for human 
purposes with some consideration of their interests, my own view posits 
that the right way to treat animals does not entail rights, but does entail 
avoiding the use of animals merely as a means to our own ends.  In this 
way I reject both views as correct understandings of our moral 
obligations towards animals. 
                                                
3 Lomasky, Loren E.  1987.  Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community.  New 
York:  Oxford University Press.  p. 224. 
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 The main issue in animal ethics is whether or not there are good 
reasons for including animals in the moral community, which consists of 
selves whose interests should be considered equally.  In what follows, I 
will present an argument in favour of adopting direct moral obligations 
towards animals, based on the agency, selfhood and autonomy of 
animals, and by using the support of already established moral theories 
that place an emphasis on these concepts.  Many moral theories and 
moral philosophers exclude animals from moral consideration for 
reasons that are not logically entailed by their own arguments.  As Taylor 
writes, “If we examine the principles that underlie our beliefs about how 
we should treat our fellow human beings, then we shall see that many of 
the ways we treat animals cannot be justified by our own principles.  
Therefore, to refuse to recognize that these ways of treating animals are 
wrong is to be irrational.”4  I believe that this flaw in moral reasoning 
stems from the common lack of knowledge of current scientific research 
on animals minds, and as such, my own view will take this evidence as 
crucial support for the moral position I take in favour of direct moral 
obligations towards animals. 
 In chapter one, I argue in favour of a conception of agency and 
selfhood that admit of degrees among species, and that is supported by 
current theories of consciousness, agency and self-awareness, as well as 
research on the mental capacities of animals that support the existence 
                                                
4 Taylor, Angus.  2009.  Animals and Ethics:  An Overview of the Philosophical 
Debate.  Third Edition.  Peterborough:  Broadview Press.  p. 63. 
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of selfhood in animals. Agency and selfhood in animals is also supported 
through arguments related to the evolutionary continuity of species.  I 
also introduce the claim that selfhood is morally valuable as it indicates 
that all conscious animals have subjective mental states as a result of the 
experiences they have as they navigate the world around them, and that 
these experiences matter to those that have them.  I consider some 
objections to the issue of whether or not we can accurately study the 
minds of animals and respond to them. 
 In chapter two I claim that autonomy also admits to degrees of 
complexity in a way similar to agency and selfhood, and that the degree 
to which an animal is an agent and self-aware indicates the degree to 
which that animal is autonomous.  I compare the ‘common view’ of 
autonomy as a feature that only humans possess to a more basic account 
of autonomy as choice, and argue that both levels of autonomy are 
plausible, and can be understood as more or less complex for both 
humans and other animals.  I provide an account of ‘naturalized 
autonomy’ that supports my own view, and explain how our treatment of 
animals would be changed by the attempt to respect the autonomy that 
animals have to the greatest extent possible. 
 As there are many other views of how ethics applies to animals, in 
chapter three I consider three of the most influential philosophers who 
have argued for the moral consideration of animals from different 
perspectives.  These include Peter Singer, who is known for his utilitarian 
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account of animal ethics, Tom Regan, who endorses an animal rights and 
abolitionist view of animal ethics, and Bernard E. Rollin, who has 
developed a position on animal ethics based on the ‘telos’ of different 
species.  Although these three philosophers make compelling arguments, 
each of them suffers from flaws that can be addressed by the inclusion of 
my own view on the importance of agency, selfhood and autonomy in 
animals.  I argue that my own view provides stronger reasons than theirs 
for the direct moral consideration of animals. 
 Kantian ethics is normally not the place to look for an account of 
direct moral obligations towards animals, as Kant claimed that we only 
owe animals indirect moral duties, out of respect towards the rest of 
humanity.  In chapter four, I consider modern reinterpretations of Kant’s 
arguments to provide support for the claim that animals should be 
considered ends-in-themselves.  I argue that despite the strength of these 
accounts, the concept of agency and selfhood that I support provides a 
better foundation for claiming animals as ends-in-themselves, and that 
respect for animal autonomy can be grounded on a Kantian argument for 
the respect of autonomy more broadly.  I claim that in virtue of their 
agency and selfhood, animals should be considered ends-in-themselves, 
thereby including them in the moral community. 
 My view is novel in that it includes agency, selfhood and autonomy 
as those features which make anyone, human or nonhuman, morally 
considerable.  As it is supported through empirical research and moral 
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theory, it makes a stronger case for the continuity of animal species that 
prevents any strict moral divide between humans and other animals.  I 
maintain however, the commonsense view that more complex mental 
capacities result in greater moral consideration, as these capacities 
correlate to levels of autonomy.  This makes sense of why we generally 
believe we have greater moral duties towards apes than frogs, and why 
we believe we ought to be paternalistic towards small children or pets, 
but not adult humans or chimpanzees in the wild (for example).  My view 
is challenging as it demands that we take the autonomy of animals 
seriously, which would result in significant changes to the ways we 
currently treat animals in agriculture, entertainment, and research.  
Changing the long history of exploitation and denial of animal mentality 
is the purpose of my thesis, and it is my hope that the arguments and 
concepts here can be usefully applied to the treatment of animals in 
practice. 
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Chapter One:  Agency, Selfhood and Animals 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an argument for the view that we owe many 
animals direct moral consideration based on certain mental capacities 
they possess.  Although many would agree with the notion that the 
suffering of animals is sufficient in making them morally considerable, I 
will argue that the possession of agency and self-awareness obligate us in 
different, and sometimes stronger ways, towards certain animals more 
than others.  My main claim is that the concepts of agency and self-
awareness apply not only to humans, but also to other animals.  As 
agency and self-awareness are capacities that autonomous individuals 
possess, this chapter paves the way for my claim in chapter two, that we 
ought to respect autonomy in animals. 
 In this chapter, I will begin by providing a description of 
agency including the cognitive features that are required to be a ‘minimal’ 
agent.  I will then argue that it makes sense to say that many animals 
ought to be considered agents, capable of acting for reasons.  Although 
there is evidence provided by empirical research into animal minds, it is 
important to notice that this evidence is based on theoretical arguments 
and assumptions that make sense of animal behaviours.  The study of 
animal cognition relies on the assumption that animals are agents, even if 
only minimally so.  This is because “If nonhuman animals don’t have 
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beliefs, and if all cognitive systems have beliefs, then animals wouldn’t be 
the proper subjects of cognitive studies.  If animals aren’t agents because 
their behavior isn’t caused by propositional attitudes, and if all cognitive 
systems are agents, we get the same conclusion.”5 As it is widely accepted 
among cognitive scientists that animals are proper subjects of study, it is 
also widely accepted that animals have beliefs and can act intentionally.  I 
will explain the theoretical arguments that justify such assumptions in 
order to assert that many animals are agents.  I will do this while 
acknowledging that while complete consensus does not exist among 
scientists that animals can be agents, it is the job of the philosopher to 
“…distinguish more clearly among different features of animal 
cognition”, in order to differentiate which mental capacities should be 
used to ground ethical arguments about animals.6   
 
Agency 
Are animals agents? Discussions of agency generally are complicated by 
the lack of agreement on two questions.  First, there are various answers 
to the question of what agency is, with definitions based on the full range 
of biological or neurological to fully-fledged reflective rationality.  
Second, there are also an abundance of answers to the question of which 
                                                
5 Andrews, Kristin, "Animal Cognition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/cognition-animal/>. 
6 Allen, Colin, and Marc Bekoff.  2007.  Animals Minds, Cognitive Ethology, and 
Ethics.  The Journal of Ethics.  11, pp. 301-302. 
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specific cognitive features constitute agency, and these are based on the 
definition provided in response to the first issue.  Without providing a 
detailed overview of the various definitions and descriptions of agency, 
there is some agreement that whether or not we are talking about 
biological or fully rational agency, what is relevant here is the general 
ability to control one’s own actions, or to act intentionally.  There is also 
a general consensus that an agent can be more or less aware of and/or 
more or less able to evaluate their own reasons for acting.  In other 
words, while all agents are able to initiate their own actions, there are 
degrees to which an agent can evaluate their own actions.  I will argue 
that all agents act for reasons, but that there is a distinction between 
individuals who are minimally rational and those who are fully rational 
when it comes to evaluating reasons for acting.   
An agent must possess beliefs, desires, goals and preferences that 
motivate their actions.  Without these features, we would be lacking any 
explanation for the causes that initiate actions.  Agents have degrees of 
self-awareness that are relevant to beliefs, experiences and perceptions 
that give rise to intentional actions.  Without even a most minimal sense 
of self, an individual could not distinguish between oneself and the rest 
of the environment, and so could not have preferences or desires to 
achieve certain goals.  In what follows, I will show that some animals 
possess the relevant features that constitute agency, and so should be 
considered intentional agents.  In chapter two, I will argue that it is in 
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virtue of animal agency that these animals are autonomous, even if only 
in the most minimal sense, and so are deserving of direct moral 
obligations. 
 
Beliefs, Desires and Preferences 
 Before we can discuss whether or not animals can be said to have 
beliefs, desires and preferences, it is worth noting the underlying 
assumptions found within the field of experimental psychology known as 
‘cognitivism’.  It is important as this view rejected the previous 
methodology and ideology of behaviorism that denied the existence of 
mental states such as beliefs and desires in favour of focusing exclusively 
on external and observable behaviors and the conditions under which 
they were elicited.  Cognitivists assume that people and some animals 
have minds.7   
Arguments to support this view are powerful.  For instance, Kristin 
Andrews explains that there are two main forms of argument used to 
support the notion that animals have minds by cognitive psychologists 
and philosophers.  The first is the argument from analogy, and the 
second is the inference to the best explanation argument.  The argument 
from analogy can be summarized as: 
1.  All animals I already know to have a mind (i.e., humans) have property 
x. 
                                                
7 Dennett, Daniel.  1995.  Do animals have beliefs? In, Roitblat, Herbert L., and 
Jean-Arcady Meyer.  Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Science.  Cambridge:  
The MIT Press.  p. 111. 
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2.  Individuals of species y have property x. 
3.  Therefore, individual of species y probably have a mind.8 
 
The inference to the best explanation argument can be summarized as: 
1. Individuals of species x engage in behaviors y. 
 
2. The best scientific explanation for an individual engaging in 
behaviors y is that it has a mind. 
 
3.  Therefore, it is likely that individuals of species x have minds.9 
 
Although there is considerable debate as to what is meant by animals 
having minds, as there is on the nature of consciousness itself, these two 
arguments provide a reasonable foundation for the study of animal 
cognition.  For without accepting or assuming animals have minds, there 
would be no reason to investigate whether or not animals have beliefs, 
desires or preferences.  Any creature that has a mind can also be 
assumed to possess the cognitive features that constitute agency.  As 
Dennett explains, “Cognitivists…take the mind seriously, and develop 
theories, models, explanations, that invoke, as real items, these internal, 
mental goings-on.  People (and at least some other animals) have minds 
after all—they are rational agents.”10  This shows how assumptions of 
minimal rationality and agency in animals is non-controversial in the 
study of animal minds.  
                                                
8 Andrews, Kristin, "Animal Cognition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/cognition-animal/>. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Dennett, Daniel.  1995.  Do animals have beliefs? In, Roitblat, Herbert L., and 
Jean-Arcady Meyer.  Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Science.  Cambridge:  
The MIT Press.  p. 111. 
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 In support of animal agency, Dennett provides an argument that 
adopts the terms of ‘folk psychology’ to answer questions about when we 
are justified in attributing ‘minds’ to others.  When we assume the 
‘intentional stance’ towards something, we are claiming that “anything 
that is usefully and voluminously predictable from the intentional stance 
is, by definition, an intentional system.”11  When we apply folk psychology 
to animals, we are accepting the assumption that animals (or at least 
some of them) are minimally rational in the sense that they believe what 
they perceive and can act on those beliefs in order to satisfy their desires 
and achieve their goals.  Taking the intentional stance towards animals 
means that what it is for an animal to be an intentional agent is for its 
behaviors to be explained and predicted by ascribing beliefs, desires and 
preferences etc. to them.  Actions by agents are governed by the rational 
consideration of their beliefs and desires.  As Dennett explains “the 
intentional stance is the strategy of interpreting the behavior of an entity 
(person, animal, artifact, whatever) by treating it as if it were a rational 
agent who governed by its ‘choice’ of ‘action’ by a ‘consideration’ of its 
‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’. “12  Despite the difficulties of finding agreement on 
the term ‘belief’, Dennett argues that “…whatever information guides an 
                                                
11 Dennett, Daniel C.  2012.  Intentional Systems Theory. Tufts University. URL:  
<http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/intentionalsystems.pdf> p. 1 
12 Ibid., p. 1 
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agent’s actions is counted under the rubric of belief.”13  The best 
explanation for animals having beliefs, according to Dennett, is because 
their behavior can best be explained and predicted by assuming that this 
is true.  Very simply, we can observe animals, watching what they notice 
and figuring out what they want through interpreting their behaviors and 
this allows us to explain and predict their actions.  The intentional stance 
is a valuable tool because it works.  The ‘reality’ of beliefs is irrelevant to 
the usefulness of assuming that (some) animals are intentional agents.14 
 Critics of this approach might claim that in ascribing such things 
as beliefs, desires and preferences to animals, we are guilty of 
anthropomorphism.  The claim is that we ought not to ascribe complex 
cognitive abilities to animals if we are able to explain their behaviors in 
non-mentalistic terms, similar to the psychological behaviorism approach 
to studying minds.  A good response to this criticism is provided by 
Frans de Waal, who responds to these critics in a way that supports 
Dennett’s views.  He argues that to dismiss the attribution of cognitive 
states to animals a priori can be called ‘anthropodenial’.  It is a mistake, 
according to de Waal, to reject the notion that humans and animals share 
characteristics and possess similar behaviors.  He says that “While it is 
true that animals are not humans, it is equally true that humans are 
animals.  Resistance to this simple yet undeniable truth is what underlies 
                                                
13 Dennett, Daniel.  1995.  Do animals have beliefs? In, Roitblat, Herbert L., and 
Jean-Arcady Meyer.  Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Science.  Cambridge:  
The MIT Press.  p. 111. 
14 Ibid., p. 2 
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the resistance to anthropomorphism.”15  If we can overcome this 
anthropodenial, then we can see the usefulness of explaining and 
predicting animal behavior by ascribing cognitive terms to the study of 
animals.  To use such language, just as Dennett argues, is valuable and 
useful for the scientific study of animal minds.  De Waal explains that,  
Obviously, if anthropomorphism is defined as the 
misattribution of human qualities to animals, no  
one wishes to be associated with it.  But much of  
the time, a broader definition is employed, namely  
the description of animal behavior in human, hence 
intentionalistic, terms.  Even though no  
anthropomorphism proponent would propose to  
apply such language uncritically, even the staunchest 
opponents of anthropomorphism do not deny its  
value as an heuristic tool.  It is this use of 
anthropomorphism as a means to get at the truth,  
rather than as an end in itself, that distinguishes its  
use in science from that by the layperson.  The  
ultimate goal of the anthropomorphizing scientist  
is emphatically not the most satisfactory projection  
of human feelings onto the animal, but testable ideas  
and replicable observations.16 
 
When we apply intentional terms to animal behaviors, that we would 
normally apply to human behaviors, we are not making any claims that 
what goes on in an animal mind is exactly the same thing.  Most would 
agree that we can not with any certainty know what it is like to be in 
animal’s mind, or to think like an animal.  But it is both premature and 
inaccurate to dismiss the possibility that what goes on in the minds of 
animals is not similar to what goes on in the minds of humans.  As we 
                                                
15 de Waal, Frans.  2006.  Primates and Philosophers:  How Morality Evolved.  
Princeton:  Princeton University Press.  p. 65. 
16 Ibid., p. 63. 
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can, in many cases, successfully predict and explain animal behavior 
using intentional language, it is the most logical method to use and apply 
to the study of animal minds.  As Dennett and de Waal agree on this 
methodology, as do most cognitive psychologists and ethologists, it 
shows that ‘anthropodenial’ is unjustified and inaccurate.   
 One way of explaining animal behaviors as intentional is to 
describe them as ‘goal-oriented’ as opposed to ‘goal-directed’.  A strong 
argument that supports this claim is made by Eric Saidel, who claims that 
animal agency as goal-oriented behavior is contrasted with goal-directed 
behavior in a way that supports the notion of animals possessing beliefs, 
desires and preferences.  His argument is particularly useful in its ability 
to make an important distinction between animals (including humans) as 
intentional agents and objects, such as plants or inorganic artifacts.17   
 Saidel’s main claim is that “…behavior that is appropriately 
explained in terms of mental states such as beliefs and desires is 
behavior directed at a goal relative to which the agent is able to learn; 
and since human behavior meets this criterion, I argue, we should expect, 
on evolutionary grounds, that some animal behavior meets this criterion 
                                                
17 The importance of this distinction will be developed in further throughout 
subsequent chapters.  Mainly, this distinction draws the line between animals 
(including humans) and other objects in a way that can be useful for 
establishing moral categories.  The first (animals) are those to whom we owe 
direct moral obligations, and the second (objects) are those to whom we (may) 
owe indirect moral obligations (like nature, or plants). 
 16 
as well.”18  Saidel adopts a realist position regarding belief-desire 
explanations, such that any behavior that is accurately explained as a 
result of assuming beliefs and desires is considered to genuinely possess 
them, and that they cause the behavior being examined.  He wants to 
argue that some animal behaviors are caused by such mental states, and I 
will focus on the elements of his argument that are most important in 
supporting this claim.19 
 Saidel argues that both beliefs and desires are forms of 
representations or internal mental states of both the world as it is, and 
the way the animal wants it to be.  While remaining agnostic as to the 
‘true’ nature of these representations, he simply claims that animals have 
some kind of mental representation of their goals and what they need to 
do to achieve them.  These representations cause the animal to act in 
accordance with their desires.  Although Saidel does not call this agency, I 
argue that it explains what is needed to be an agent most basically, which 
is the ability to direct one’s own behavior in accordance with one’s goals, 
beliefs, desires and preferences.  There must be some mental content, in 
the form of beliefs and desires etc., even minimally, that causes one to 
act.  This is important in distinguishing between agents and other 
objects, as agents act as a result of distinct mental representations, 
whereas plants ‘act’ as a result of goal-oriented causes.  Saidel describes 
                                                
18 Saidel, Eric. 2009.  Attributing mental representations to animals.  In, Lurz, 
Robert W.  Ed.  The Philosophy of Animal Minds.  New York:  Cambridge 
University Press.  p. 35. 
19 Ibid., pp. 35-36. 
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how some plants move in such a way as to follow the sun, as a result of 
chemical reactions between the light from the sun and chemicals in the 
plant.  This behavior is goal-oriented, as it is not based on mental 
representations of any kind, but rather an evolutionary mechanism that 
helps the plant achieve a particular goal.  The goal itself plays no role in 
the movement of the plant, but rather it is oriented by evolution to 
achieve a particular goal.  Such behavior can be found in some animals as 
well, such as stereotypical behavior that is beneficial from an 
evolutionary perspective, and which the animal performs without needing 
any mental representations of its goal.20 
 Goal-directed behavior is contrasted with goal-oriented behavior as 
it is based on a representation of a particular goal, and the animal in 
question acts in such a way as to achieve that goal.  Examples of this 
provided by Saidel include rats navigating a maze or chimpanzees 
cracking nuts on rocks using sticks, both which demonstrate the ability 
to “…abandon one behavior and adopt another while still retaining the 
goal that the previous behavior was aimed at achieving, and toward which 
the new behavior is now directed.”21  Goal-directed behavior thus requires 
a kind of learning that only some animals are capable of.  They have the 
ability to learn specific ways to achieve their goals by forming new 
associations of their goals. 22  Saidel continues his argument by providing 
                                                
20 Ibid., p. 38. 
21 Ibid., p. 39. 
22 Ibid., p. 39. 
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specific examples of such behavior in animals from empirical studies, 
which I will not include here.  However, the main point he is making is 
that animals would not be able to act in a goal-directed fashion unless 
they had mental representations of both the means to achieve their ends, 
as well as representations of those ends.  Attributing beliefs and desires 
to these animals, Saidel argues, is the best way to explain their 
behaviors.23   
 Some of Saidel’s argument is in agreement with Dennett and de 
Waal, as he agrees with them that the methodology of adopting the 
intentional stance is most useful in explaining the behavior of animals.  
He differs from Dennett in his distinction between goal-oriented and 
goal-directed behaviors, as Dennett would argue that taking the 
intentional stance would not only explain the actions of humans and 
animals, but also machines or objects.  As Saidel focuses on the element 
of learning to distinguish goal-directed behavior from goal-oriented 
behavior, his argument provides more support for the claim that I want 
to make that agents are distinctively different from other objects and this 
has important implications for the moral treatment of them.  Only agents 
can be said to be autonomous, and so only agents are deserving of direct 
moral obligations.  
  
Rationality 
                                                
23 Ibid., p. 51. 
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 An important feature of agency is rationality.  A very commonly 
cited ‘gap’ between humans and other animals is the ability to reason.  
However, reason can mean many different things, and one can be more or 
less able to reason.  The intellectually disabled and small children are 
examples of those humans whose ability to reason is greatly diminished, 
and yet we would still treat them and view them as agents.  In a similar 
way, animals can be more or less rational, and here I take reason to refer 
to the ability to make choices or act for reasons, whether good or bad, 
evaluated or not.  If animals do act for reasons, based on their beliefs, 
desires, and preferences, then they are acting rationally, and thus are 
intentional agents.  I claim that the difference between humans and other 
animals, in terms of rationality, is then a matter of degree, rather than 
one of the existence of rationality itself. 
 Fred Dretske makes some important distinctions between the kinds 
or levels of rationality that exist in humans and animals, and argues that 
(some) animals are minimally rational, as opposed to biologically rational 
or fully rational.  Biological rationality, according to Dretske, is something 
like our blink reflex, where the action is not purposeful, but can be 
understood as designed by natural selection to achieve greater fitness.  
This is because biological rationality is not governed by thought.24  
Dretske argues that minimal rationality differs from biological rationality, 
as, “Minimal rationality requires that what is done be done for reasons, 
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Matthew.  (eds.)  Rational Animals?  Toronto:  Oxford University Press.  p. 107. 
 20 
but it doesn’t require that it be done for good reasons.  Nor does it 
require reasoning.  Although the behavior must be explained by a 
thought in order to quality as minimally rational, it needn’t be 
rationalized or rationally justified by the thought that explains it, and the 
agent needn’t have computed (reasoned) his way to that result.”25  
Dretske believes that it is useful to assume that animals act for reasons 
and based on thought as it allow us to separate the question of having 
good reasons from having reasons at all.  As we tend to judge reason on 
the basis of having good reasons, we can tend to ignore reason as the 
cause of behaviors that we can’t, at first glance, understand.  Once again, 
this view seems to support the intentional stance by making the 
assumption that animals act as a result of reasons, and therefore are 
intentional agents.  Without this first assumption, we could not even 
begin to investigate what reasons an animal may have for its behavior, 
thus making it impossible to understand animal behavior at all.  Further 
support is provided by Dretske, who similarly to Saidel, contends that 
learning is integral in distinguishing minimally rational actions from 
mechanistic ones.  Referring to cases where birds learn not to eat 
monarch butterflies or any butterflies that look similar to monarchs as a 
result of becoming ill, Dretske argues that it must be thought that allows 
the birds to engage in this avoidance behavior.  Some kind of internal 
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mental representation in the bird’s mind of these butterflies explains the 
causes of the resulting behaviors.26  Dretske concludes: 
Is the bird’s behavior really purposeful?  Does the  
bird really think (mistakenly) that the bug it sees  
tastes bad?  Is this really why it avoids the bug?   
All I have argued, I know, is that in this kind of  
learning process an internal state that indicates or  
means something about the animal’s external  
environment comes to play a role in the animal’s  
subsequent behavior, and it comes to play that  
role because of what it means…The informational  
content or meaning of this internal, causal, element  
is, thus, genuinely explanatory.  This, I concede, is  
not sufficient to show that thought is governing  
the acquired behavior in the relevant (explanatory)  
sense since I have not shown that internal states  
with meaning of this kind are thoughts.  Still, we  
have here, if not thought itself, a plausible  
antecedent of thought—an internal representation  
whose meaning or content explains why the system  
in which it occurs behaves the way it does…To my  
ear, that sounds enough like thought not to haggle  
about what is still missing.27 
 
As we encountered with the concepts of agency and belief, the wide 
variety of definitions of rationality and thought make it difficult to reach 
one certain concept of each.  But if we can explain an animal’s behavior 
by identifying the possible reasons and mental representations that cause 
it, then we can at least agree that regardless of the specific nature of such 
representations, assuming them is the best way to explain and predict 
that behavior.  When studying animal behavior, researchers look for 
capabilities that may be associated with reason, such as tool use and 
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problem-solving skills.  Tool use by animals is best explained, for 
example, as the ability to identify a problem, consider various ways of 
solving the problem, and understanding how objects can be used to 
overcome the problem.28  According to Dretske, this would be a good 
example of minimal rationality. 
 Rationality, as the ability to act for reasons, is required for one to 
be considered an agent.  These reasons are constituted by and best 
explained as a result of the possession of beliefs, desires and preferences.  
Some animals can be considered minimally rational, and able to direct 
their own actions and behaviors based on internal mental 
representations. 
 
Self-Awareness and Selfhood 
 Self-awareness is also an important feature of agency, as it allows 
one to be aware one’s own beliefs, desires and preferences, even if only in 
a minimal sense.  Most importantly, it allows one to have preferences 
which can determine one’s choices among various options for acting.  
This is important as it relates to autonomy, as we value the freedom to 
make our own choices, good or bad, as a result of what we value.  
Restricting the ability to make free choices is to restrict one’s autonomy, 
as I will argue further in chapter two.  There are good reasons for 
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accepting the assumption that many animals are self-aware, based on 
both empirical research and the acceptance of the intentional stance in 
explaining and predicting animal behavior. 
Self-awareness, on my view, is an important feature of 
consciousness in virtue of its moral significance.  It is however, also 
considered to be the ‘hard problem’ within the study of consciousness 
generally.29  Broadly construed, “…self-awareness means to be aware of 
one’s own feelings or emotions and to be conscious of pain, but self-
awareness also includes awareness of one’s body (e.g. allowing 
recognition of oneself in a mirror), one’s state of mind, one’s self in a 
social context, and numerous other, ill-defined attributes that we would 
assign ourselves.”30 This suggested definition of self-awareness clearly 
admits of degrees, from a basic awareness of one’s own body and 
feelings, to a more complex awareness of oneself and others required for 
social interactions.   
I’m going to show that there are two levels of self-awareness, 
minimal and rich.  Some people define self-awareness only at higher-
order levels, where “…our thoughts and experiences become available to 
us for introspection:  we can think about what we think, and know what 
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we know.”31 This view is based on a sense of self that allows for personal 
identity, or an ‘I-ness’, where one’s self can become an object of 
examination and reflection.  A good characterization of this view is 
provided by Cheney and Seyfarth, who describe this sense of self as “…an 
explicit sense of self emerges in children at roughly the same age as the 
ability to attribute knowledge and beliefs to others.”32  This ‘explicit’ 
sense of self, I claim, may be found in some primates, elephants, and 
dolphins, partly due to their ability to successfully pass mirror self-
recognition tests that indicate an advanced understanding of the 
difference between self and other.  These sorts of tests, however, should 
be interpreted with caution, as some species may not pass them due to 
differences between such things as ‘primary sensory modalities of 
recognition’ that can vary among species.33  However, an explicit sense of 
self-identity is not required for less complex forms of selfhood to exist, 
and degrees of selfhood can be explained, in part, as a result of biological 
theories or observations made in cognitive ethology.  For example, Bekoff 
and Sherman argue: 
The position of an individual on the self-cognizance  
continuum is determined, ultimately, by natural  
selection, based on the degree to which members  
of its species or group (e.g. males or females)  
repeat competitive or cooperative interactions  
with the same conspecifics over their lifetimes  
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and benefit from changing their responses in light  
of outcomes of those previous interactions.34 
 
Bekoff and Sherman stress the point that self-cognizance is a matter of 
degree across species and individuals, rather than a matter of kind.  They 
argue that there are three main categories or levels of self-cognizance, 
including self-referencing (which can be noncognitive), self-awareness, 
and self-consciousness.  The more social the species is, they argue, the 
more likely that individuals of that species are self-conscious, which 
allows for reflective responses to the behaviours of others.  Self-
awareness is described as perceptual consciousness, or mine-ness or 
body-ness, which we will examine further in the next section.35  
Importantly, the main emphasis of their research establishes that 
selfhood is found at more than just the richest level we associate with 
humans, in other animal species. 
 Self-awareness, in its less complex levels, has been described as a 
sense of ‘mineness’, or ‘phenomenal’ self-awareness.  This level of self-
awareness also means that there is ‘something it is like’ to be that 
particular animal.  One view that captures this level of self-awareness is 
described by Marc Bekoff as ‘mineness’ as a sense of ‘bodyness’.  This 
level of self-awareness is more complex than simple perceptions of 
stimuli in the external world, which is also referred to as sentience.  
Bekoff explains ‘bodyness’ or ‘mineness’ in the following way:  “Thus, for 
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example, some experimental treatment, object, or other individual might 
cause pain, and the receiving individual says something like ‘Something is 
happening to this body, and I had better do something about it.’  There is 
no need to associate this body with my body or ‘me’ (or ‘I’).”36 Further to 
this, he describes how his dog, Jethro, obviously knew that he was not his 
dog friend, Zeke.  He argues that most animals are able to identify 
objects as their own (i.e., ‘this is my toy, or my mate’, etc.), and that this 
knowledge is what allows animals to function in their own ‘worlds’.  
Bekoff says:  
He (Jethro) and other animals have a sense of  
possession or a sense of mine-ness, or body-ness,  
if you will.  So, in this way they have a sense of  
self…Jethro could communicate a wide variety of  
messages, socially interact in numerous and  
varied contexts, and enjoy life as a dog.  So, too,  
can chimpanzees, rhesus monkeys, wolves, bears,  
crows, sweat bees, ants, and many others  
animals…He (Jethro) also showed social  
self-awareness in that he was aware of his various  
and different relationships with others.  Whether  
or not he had an introspective self and a theory of  
his and others’ minds remains unknown.  It surely  
would be premature to conclude that he did not.37  
   
On this view, selfhood in its minimal sense refers to an awareness 
of oneself and others, and allows an individual to interact with others in 
social relationships.  This sense of mine-ness does not require a full or 
rich sense of personal identity, or even a theory of mind, but rather it 
requires a level of consciousness whereby an animal is simply is aware of 
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its own body, and which allows that animal to respond to objects and 
other animals in appropriate ways. For me to acknowledge this pain as 
belonging to me, there must be a ‘me’ there, or a subject that experiences 
this pain as my own.  This sense of self is immediate, and basic to all 
conscious creatures, including animals.  If there was no sense of self, 
even minimally for an individual, there would be nothing to which the 
experience belonged to, or no one to experience pain.   
Another good argument in favour of minimal selfhood is provided 
by Dan Zahavi, who argues that less complex levels of selfhood exist: 
“Contrary to what some of the self-skeptics are claiming, one does not 
need to conceive of the self as something standing apart from or above 
experiences, nor does one need to conceive of the relation between self 
and experience as an external relation of ownership.  It is also possible to 
identify this pre-reflective sense of mineness with a minimal, or core, 
sense of self.”38  The sense of mineness can also be described as 
‘phenomenal consciousness’, which is simply the feeling that 
accompanies self-awareness.   
Phenomenal consciousness refers to “the qualitative, subjective, 
experiential, or phenomenological aspects of conscious experience, 
sometimes identified with qualia.”39 The extremely skeptical take issue 
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with the epistemological issues raised by the topic of knowing other 
minds.  For them, the idea of access to other minds across species would 
be laughable.  For as Nagel argues, although there is surely something it 
is like to be a bat, we could not ever know, through science, observation, 
or description, what it is actually like to be a bat.40   
However, while I don’t know what it is like to have wings and fly, 
neither do I know what it is like to be blind, or to be a man, for that 
matter.  But for us to communicate and function in the world we focus on 
the shared features of experiences that we do have.   Granted, I may have 
less in common with a dog than with a man, but through the observation 
of responses to various stimuli, physical and physiological similarities, 
etc., I can still make substantiated claims about the experiences of the 
dog.  The important point in determining if animals have a self at all is 
whether or not they have experiences of what it is like to be them, rather 
than determining what it is actually like.   
If animals are phenomenally conscious, then they have a self, at 
least in a form less complex than found in humans.  This is a result of the 
nature of experience and perception, which requires a subject, as a 
property of consciousness.  As Zahavi describes, “…there is a minimal 
sense of self present whenever there is self-awareness.  Self-awareness is 
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there not only when I realize that I am perceiving a candle, but whenever 
I am acquainted with an experience in its first-personal mode of 
givenness, that is, whenever there is something it is like for me to have 
the experience.  In other words, pre-reflective self-awareness and a 
minimal sense of self are integral parts of our experiential life.”41 Zahavi 
further writes in a footnote to this passage that,  
If this is true, it has some rather obvious  
consequences for the attribution of both self  
and self-consciousness to animals.  It is also  
obvious, of course, that there are higher and more  
complex forms of self-consciousness that most,  
if not all, nonhuman animals lack.  As for the  
question of where to draw the line, i.e., whether it  
also makes sense to ascribe a sense of self to lower 
organisms such as birds, amphibians, fish, beetles,  
worms, etc., this is a question that I will leave for  
others to decide.  All I will say is that if a certain  
organism is in possession of phenomenal  
consciousness, then it must also be in possession  
of both a primitive form of self-consciousness and  
a core self.42    
 
The ‘core self’ is a useful term to denote the most minimal form of 
selfhood, which has also been described in this chapter as ‘mine-ness’, ‘ 
body-ness’, and phenomenal consciousness.  It is not a rich sense of 
personal identity, or as fully reflective as the self-consciousness that 
most humans possess, but it is selfhood nonetheless.  Selfhood is not the 
kind of mental characteristic that either exists in its richest form or not 
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at all, but rather it appears in degrees across species and among 
conscious individuals. 
A strong argument that supports the existence of self-awareness in 
animals is made by DeGrazia, who claims that self-awareness is required 
for intentional behavior, based on the ‘belief-desire’ model of intentional 
action.  He claims that “Much behavior among sentient animals suggests 
desires.  Much of this same behavior, I submit, is best understood as 
reflecting beliefs that, together with the relevant desires, produce 
intentional action.”43  DeGrazia admits, as Saidel and Dennett do, that 
beliefs and desires are difficult to define, but that despite these problems 
we can generalize that animals do have mental representations based on 
perceptions that provide content, providing the grounds or reasons for 
their actions.  Desires and intentional actions require a sense of oneself 
persisting through time, and even if only rudimentary, this requires self-
awareness and the ability to desire the intended goal, create a plan to 
achieve it, and a representation of completing the plan.  DeGrazia claims 
that “If this is correct, then a common-sense appreciation of the ordinary 
behaviors of many animals suggests a kind of self-awareness—namely, 
bodily self-awareness, here with an emphasis on the agency aspect.”44  
After citing various studies of animals using tools and solving problems, 
DeGrazia concludes that such evidence supports the claim that 
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intentional action is only possible if these animals have a sense of 
themselves persisting in time long enough to achieve their goals, a sense 
of their own bodies as distinct from the rest of their environment, and of 
their bodies as subjects of their own direct control.45  In this way, 
DeGrazia provides an important connection between beliefs, desires and 
preferences and the self-awareness needed to possess such capabilities in 
order to be considered an intentional agent.  Without self-awareness, 
animals could not act in goal-directed ways, or intentionally. 
McGinn argues in favour of selfhood in animals in a similar way to 
Zahavi, by maintaining the view that experiences cannot exist with a 
subject that unifies them.  I agree with his claim, when referring to work 
by Frege, McGinn says: 
Experience can never exist as a simple unanalyzable  
quality.  The experience is always for something that  
is not itself an experience.  We have a dyadic structure, 
consisting of a subject and what that subject  
experiences.  The subject is not represented in the  
content of experience, of course; it is rather a  
precondition of there being any experience at all.  The  
self is what has the experience, not something that the 
experience is about.46 
 
This minimal sense of selfhood is all that is required for interests to 
matter to an individual.  This would apply equally to small human 
children and those with intellectual disabilities.  There is no good reason 
to not include animals into the community of selves, if we believe that 
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marginal humans belong to it, as in many cases animals possess greater 
degrees of selfhood than these human individuals. 
McGinn argues that although different species of animals may have 
different moral weight, depending on the complexity of selfhood, every 
experiencing organism belongs to the same category as a subject of 
consciousness.  He says:  
People have slowly come to accept that animals  
have experiences, in just as robust a sense as we  
do, but they have been reluctant to grant selfhood  
to animals.  Selfhood is the thing that is held to  
distinguish us from the beasts, to put us on a  
different moral plane.  This matters morally because  
the primary object of moral respect is precisely the  
self—that to which experiences happen…The moral 
community is the community of selves, and animals  
belong to this just as much as humans.47 
 
McGinn rejects common moral objections to such a minimal requirement 
for moral consideration, including the idea that only moral agents 
capable of reflection are morally significant.  Even a minimal sense of 
selfhood indicates that an individual can experience pain and suffering, 
for example, and to kill an animal is, “…snuffing out a self, not simply 
interrupting a sequence of connected experiences.”48   
 An important implication of this sort of view is supported by 
Cavalieri and Miller, who argue that the self is prescriptive as every 
sentient being has an awareness of how things seem to them as well as 
how things are going for them.  They claim that just because animals are 
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unable to express their mental states with language, it does not mean 
that they are lacking mental states or subjectivity that humans possess.  
They acknowledge that it is more difficult to understand the subjectivity 
of animals than of humans, but that we have enough evidence to show 
that many animals (particularly social species) are perceptually conscious, 
and that this requires a sense of self.  Social animals, as they must 
understand relational, predictive and manipulatory problems (within 
social groups or between predators and prey) display a theory of mind as, 
“we become selves as we come to recognize selves.”49  As animals 
navigate their way through their environments, they make decisions 
based on their interests.  And, “interests bring an evaluative aspect of the 
self which adds to the descriptive one.  But the root goes deeper than 
interests.  Why would the self see the satisfaction of its interests as good 
and value it, if it did not value itself?“50  By not acknowledging the moral 
value of selfhood in animals, yet respecting it in humans, Cavalieri and 
Miller argue that we are simply being speciesist.   
 Being speciesist is immoral in the same way that being racist or 
sexist is immoral.  Basically, it means placing the interests of one’s own 
species above the interests of other species for no other reason than 
species membership.  This view was made popular by Peter Singer, who 
claimed that species is an arbitrary category with which to make moral 
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distinctions, if sentience is shared between the species in question whose 
interests may be in conflict.51  Although Singer, as a utilitarian, focuses on 
the interests of individuals and sentience as mattering morally, Cavalieri 
and Miller believe that selfhood must also be recognized as a morally 
relevant feature across species.  So to deny that animals have selves 
would not only be empirically inaccurate, but it would also be speciesist, 
and thus, morally wrong. 
Although many contemporary moral philosophers have made room 
for the consideration of animal interests in their theories, they do not go 
far enough in respecting the selfhood of animals.  This is mainly due to 
their acceptance of animal consciousness, but not animal selfhood.  As I 
will argue further in Chapter Two, the autonomy that accompanies 
selfhood requires that we respect every individual’s choices to the 
greatest degree possible, out of respect for the individual, not just their 
interests.  It tends to be the case that when we focus on the interests of 
an animal we can still justify our treating it as merely a means to our own 
end, and not as an individual deserving of being treated as an end-in-
itself.  Cavalieri and Miller would agree with my view as they conclude:  
But, insofar as the deep, unifying prescriptive aspect  
of the self is not recognized, nonhuman lives are  
seen as expendable, and nonhuman interests are  
seen in a fragmentary way, and are subjected to  
aggregative calculus without any side constraints in  
the form of basic protection from interference.  In  
what has been aptly defined ‘utilitarianism for  
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animals, Kantianism for humans’ (Nozick, 1974),  
while humans are emphatically seen as selves, the  
other animals are considered as mere receptacles of 
experiences which can be separately weighed and  
traded-off.  In fact, one could say that for mainstream  
moral philosophy nonhumans, though conscious,  
have no self.52 
 
Taking the animal self seriously means rejecting a utilitarian account of 
animal ethics that focuses on the interests that animals possess, rather 
than animals themselves, as I will argue further in Chapter Three.  A 
Kantian account of the moral importance of selfhood and autonomy 
provides a solution to the problem raised by Cavalieri and Miller, as it can 
be argued that animals are ends-in-themselves in the same way that 
humans are.  I will argue for this in Chapter Four.  If we accept that 
animals are conscious and thereby self-aware, then the moral significance 
of selfhood requires us to respect the autonomy of that accompanies it.   
 
Empirical Evidence for Selfhood in Animals 
 Evidence for selfhood in animals takes many different forms, and 
there is no singular experiment or type of test that can be applied to 
animals to search for consciousness.  However, if we take the body of 
evidence for animal consciousness as a whole, a strong argument can be 
made that cumulative evidence suggests many animal species are not 
only conscious, but also self-aware, and in varying degrees.  In what 
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follows, I have organized a sampling of the kinds of evidence that 
support the existence of consciousness and selfhood in animals.            
Mirror self-recognition tests 
 Perhaps the most well known experiments designed to search for 
self-awareness in animals is the mirror self-recognition test, originally 
designed by Gallup and used on chimpanzees.  By placing a mark of 
rouge on anesthetized chimpanzees and then putting them in front of 
mirrors after awakening, he observed whether or not the animal would 
touch the reflection in the mirror or on its own head to examine the 
rouge mark.53    Animals that touch or attempt to touch the mark on their 
own bodies while watching themselves in a mirror are considered to have 
successfully passed the test, and are considered self-aware.      These 
tests have been performed on many other species, and only human 
children over the age of two, dolphins, elephants, and great apes have 
passed the test along with chimpanzees.54  However, one challenge posed 
by such tests is that animals from dissimilar species will require uniquely 
designed experiments to test for this ability.  For example, as dolphins do 
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not have arms or hands, it meant that it posed more of a challenge to 
interpret their behaviour after being ‘marked’ as indicative of self-
recognition (during experiments).55  So, aside from the fact that these 
experiments do not provide an absolute standard for identifying 
selfhood, they are difficult to design for various species.  Fortunately, 
they are not the only source of evidence for selfhood in animals. 
 Although there are many kinds of memory, the focus of many 
studies on animals relates specifically to episodic memory.  This is 
described as, “…the conscious recall of specific past experience…” and, 
“thus, episodic memory provides information about the ‘what’ and ‘when’ 
of events (temporally dated experiences) and about ‘where’ they 
happened (temporal-spatial relations)…This suggests that episodic 
memory is critically dependent on the concept of self.”56    Animals 
including cephalopods (octopuses and cuttlefish, in particular), food-
storing birds such as scrub jays and the storing marsh tit, chimpanzees, 
rhesus monkeys and gorillas, some rodents (mice and rats), and dolphins 
have all demonstrated behaviours considered indicative of episodic 
memory.57  This is a particularly important mental capacity for supporting 
                                                
55 Marino, Lori, Reiss, Diana and Gordon G. Gallup, Jr.  1994. In Sue Taylor 
Parker, Robert W. Mitchell and Maria L. Boccia.  Eds.  Self-Awareness in Animals 
and Humans:  Developmental Perspectives.  New York:  Cambridge University 
Press.  pp. 387-388. 
56 Reznikova, Zhanna.  2007.  Animal Intelligence:  From Individual to Social 
Cognition.  New York:  Cambridge University Press.  p. 76. 
57 Ibid., pp. 77-83.  See also Genarro, Rocco J.  Animals, consciousness and I-
thoughts.  In Lurz, Robert W.  Ed.  2009.  The Philosophy of Animal Minds.  New 
York:  Cambridge University Press.  pp. 188-189, and Hampton, Robert R.  
 38 
the existence of selfhood in animals, as it suggests that along with basic 
concepts of objects, comes an understanding of them as enduring 
through time.  As Genarro suggests, “…if a conscious organism can 
reidentify the same object at different times, then it implicitly 
understands itself as something which endures through time.”58   The 
ability to recall past experiences requires at least a minimal form of 
‘mental time travel’, and this requires at least a minimal form of self-
awareness. 
 Although the definition of what counts as a ‘tool’ has been debated 
among scientists studying animals, it is generally agreed that it involves 
intentional action, problem-solving skills and an awareness of the 
purpose for which it is intended.59  Tools are different from ‘artefacts’ 
such as beaver dams and nests, as they require that the animal select, 
prepare and understand the function of the objects they choose for their 
particular purpose.60 Many birds have been observed to use tools for the 
purposes of gaining access to food, grooming feathers, as a hammer, or 
used as a missile.  Birds including blue jays, Darwin’s finches, crows, 
ravens, marsh tits, rooks, and Egyptian vultures have used tools for the 
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aforementioned purposes.  Rodents, sea otters, primates of various kinds 
and elephants have also been shown to use tools, mainly for gaining 
access to food, but also for such things as protecting sensitive body parts 
against sharp objects (like coral or walking on rocks), to play with, as 
weapons or for simply prodding others into play.61  While tool use may 
seem to indicate the existence of very complex mental capacities, insects 
such as ants and wasps, as well as crabs have also used simple tools to 
ward off attackers or lure prey.62  This may make it seem absurd to 
suggest that tool use is linked to self-awareness, unless we consider that 
mental capacities differ among species according to the particular 
environment in which they live.   So while some insects are capable of 
using tools, they may not exhibit social behaviour, or the capacity for 
communication, all of which have been attributed to certain primates and 
dolphins, for example.   
Communication among animals takes many different forms, 
depending on the species and its physical and behavioural traits.   
Communication is basically the exhange of information between sender 
and receiver using behavioural or other signals.  Animal communication 
performs multiple functions, including, “(1) to advertise individual 
identity, presence and behavioural predispositions; (2) to establish social 
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hierarchies; (3) to synchronise the physiological states of a group during 
breeding seasons; (4) to monitor the environment collectively for dangers 
and opportunities; (5) to synchronise organized activities (migration, 
foraging).”63  These signals can be olfactory (such as scent glands or 
specialized skin cells in fish), taste (such as cats, sheep and goats tasting 
urine), audition (such as bird or primate vocalizations), or vision (such as 
gesturing, using body postures or making facial expressions).64  Studying 
animal communication can provide important evidence in support of 
animal consciousness, as it indicates that animals understand both the 
situation they find themselves in, as well as the concept of other minds.  
As communication provides benefits for animals (such as predator/prey 
interactions), those with more developed communication skills may have 
greater evolutionary success.  This would explain the evolutionary 
success of humans, but it would also support the notion that the 
cognitive capacities underlying language and communication are simply 
more or less complex, rather than considering human language as a 
defining feature of humans (and thereby supporting the idea that only 
humans have thoughts and/or concepts). 
 There are too many specific examples of animal communication to 
provide here, but a few are worth mentioning.  One distinction in 
studying animal communication is between human/animal experiments, 
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where humans ‘train’ animals to respond to cues, and observations of 
animal communication in the wild.  Perhaps most well known are studies 
where experimenters have taught various primates to use sign language.  
It has been shown through numerous experiments that primates are not 
just imitating signs, but that they understand what they are saying.65   
Parrots have also been taught to use English, most notably the 
African grey, Alex, who learned more than 100 words and demonstrated 
that he understood what he was saying, by correctly responding to 
various questions, and by indicating his own preferences (like where to 
sit, or when to exercise, etc.).66  Irene Pepperberg, who trained Alex, has 
argued that parrots with this ability are most likely at least perceptually 
conscious in order to make correct associations between objects and 
words, and to answer questions correctly (in a statistically significant 
way) that they have not heard before.67  Experiments involving gaze-
following in dogs and chimpanzees and human experimenters have 
shown an immediate grasp and understanding by these animals of 
human gestures.68  Dolphins excel in understanding human language 
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(usually an ‘artificial’ language of gestures), and it has been claimed that 
they understand the semantic and syntactic features of sentences.69  
Communication among animals has been observed in so many forms, it is 
too extensive to list here.  Suffice to say, this is an area of scientific study 
that is increasing as more acceptance of intentional behaviour in animals 
is increasing.70 
Other research into the social relationships among animals, their 
abilities to play, deceive, and imitate also provide evidence in favour of 
the existence of selfhood in animals.71  For animals to be capable of such 
behaviours, they must be able to have at least a minimal sense of self, 
and a sense of other minds, in some cases of time, and of the world 
around them and the choices it presents to them.  They may not 
rationally reflect on these experiences, but they must have a level of self-
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awareness that allows them to make decisions based on their own beliefs, 
desires, and goals.  On my view, the more mental capacities that a species 
possesses as demonstrated by the kinds of evidence presented in this 
chapter, the more complex sense of selfhood that species has. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued that animals should be considered 
agents, and as self-aware in some cases, at least minimally.  Many animals 
possess beliefs, preferences, and desires and are self-aware and agents to 
greater or lesser degrees.  Not only is this view well supported by 
evidence, both empirically and logically, but it is also relevant when 
determining who we ought to count as autonomous and thus morally 
considerable.  It also assists us in understanding to what extent we are 
morally obligated towards animals of various species, based on varying 
degrees of autonomy as it results from varying degrees of self-awareness 
and agency.  This chapter provides the groundwork for what follows in 
chapter two, where I argue that agency and selfhood imply that some 
animals are autonomous in varying degrees, and that this provides us 
with specific guidance as to how we ought to treat other animals. 
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Chapter Two:  Autonomy and Animals 
 
Introduction 
In chapter one, I argued that agency and selfhood are features of 
conscious animals, and that these capacities exist in more and less 
complex levels depending on the mental capacities found in different 
species.  I also argued that agency and selfhood are morally valuable as 
they indicate a subject for whom experiences matter.  But we need more 
explanation for why we ought to respect agency and selfhood in animals, 
and for how we can do this.  Autonomy, as a moral concept, best fits with 
my view on agency and selfhood as it requires respect not only for 
someone’s interests, but for the individual as the one who experiences 
the thwarting or fulfillment of those interests.  Just as I argued that 
agency and selfhood can be more or less complex, so too can autonomy 
exist in varying degrees. 
That is not to say that the various conceptions of autonomy that 
most accept are not important, or that there are levels of autonomy that 
are not uniquely human.  The attempt to achieve ‘authenticity’ or ‘heroic’ 
autonomy is a human quest, and a worthy one.  But if autonomy ranges 
from self-governance over our most trivial actions to authenticity, then 
the concept clearly admits to existing in degrees.  A person who is 
intellectually disabled is autonomous but not to the same level of 
complexity as someone who reads Spinoza in an attempt to achieve 
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authenticity.  However, on my view each level of autonomy is equally 
valuable in terms of the moral obligations owed to each person. 
I will support this view by first considering what I call the ‘common 
view’ of autonomy, whereby only normal, adult humans are considered 
autonomous persons.  After pointing out the problems with this 
conception of autonomy, I posit the view that autonomy can exist at both 
rich, human levels and more minimal, animal and ‘marginal human’ 
levels.  We simply owe individuals respect for their autonomy to the 
extent that they are self-aware.  I explain how moral duties are founded 
on autonomy, by including an analysis of Gewirth’s argument on this 
subject.  I also consider other views of autonomy that complement my 
own, and that challenge the ‘common view’ to show that although not 
widely popular, accounts of a more minimal autonomy in animals are 
plausible and well-supported. 
 
The Common View of Autonomy 
 Autonomy is a commonly used moral concept with which to judge 
our treatment of others.  In medicine, for example, we use the concept of 
autonomy to help determine if someone has made an informed and free 
decision regarding a prescribed treatment or procedure.   We shun overly 
paternalistic models of professional physician-patient relationships 
because we believe that significant harms can result from overriding a 
patient’s wishes and decisions regarding their own treatment.  Autonomy 
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also guides us in our personal relationships with others, and provides us 
with a measure of how we ought to treat our friends, family members, 
and partners.  ‘Good’ relationships are usually judged by the level of 
respect each member has for the other, to allow for the maximal personal 
fulfillment of each person.    We also believe that to respect someone else 
means to also respect their autonomy, as personhood implies certain 
faculties and characteristics that allow one control over their own actions 
and decisions.  In a moral sense, we want to respect the autonomy of 
others because we want the same respect to be given to us.  Just as we 
value our own freedom to act in accordance with our desires and 
preferences, so too do we value the same freedom in others.  Generally 
speaking, we refer to this freedom as autonomy.  
Gerald Dworkin describes the various meanings of autonomy: 
It is sometimes used as an equivalent of liberty  
(positive or negative in Berlin’s terminology),  
sometimes as equivalent to self-rule or sovereignty, 
sometimes as identical with freedom of the will.   
It is equated with dignity, integrity, individuality, 
independence, responsibility, and self-knowledge.   
It is identified with qualities of self-assertion, with  
critical reflection, with freedom from obligation,  
with absence of external causation, with knowledge  
of one’s own interests.  It is even equated by some 
economists with the impossibility of interpersonal 
comparisons.  It is related to actions, to beliefs, to  
reasons for acting, to rules, to the will of other  
persons, to thoughts, and to principles.  About the  
only features held constant from one author to  
another are that autonomy is a feature of persons  
and that it is a desirable quality to have.  It is very  
unlikely that there is a core meaning which underlies  
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all these various uses of the term.72  
 
Of particular importance in this passage is Dworkin’s claim that the two 
constant features of autonomy are personhood and that it is a desirable 
quality to have.   It is also significant that he claims that autonomy defies 
a core meaning.  In other words, there are many different definitions of 
autonomy, which allows for ample debate on the topic.  Generally, 
personhood is related to autonomy as a way of delineating those who are 
owed direct moral obligations from those who are not, and this would 
distinguishes humans as persons from non-human animals.  As such, it 
gives us a neat classification between ‘someone’ and ‘something’, that 
latter of which we may owe indirect moral duties, as in Kant’s theory as 
to how we ought to treat animals (in chapter four I present a fuller 
account of this).  Autonomy as a desirable quality to have can be 
understood as our desire to act freely, in order to fulfill our interests and 
preferences.  The freedom to do so allows us to achieve the fulfillment of 
what we believe is good for us, or makes us happy and satisfied.  To act 
without autonomy is to be manipulated, coerced, or forced to act against 
our own will, which mainly results in frustration and suffering.   
Without a core meaning, it can be difficult to narrow down why 
autonomy is such a desired feature.  But if we think about the role that 
autonomy plays in moral theory, we can roughly argue that it is valuable 
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as it represents the ability people have to direct their own actions 
independently from the influence of others.  That is, autonomy basically 
means being able to make one’s own decisions, for one’s own reasons.  
And autonomy provides us with a moral and political standard to guide 
us in determining appropriate ways to interact with each other.  Although 
it would be impossible to make decisions without the influence of others 
entirely, autonomy allows us to control everything from our most basic 
actions to those that reflect our grandest future goals.  Moral theories 
and laws protect this ability or freedom we have by elaborating on the 
ways we can best exercise and develop it through our relationships with 
others individually and within society as a whole. 
Nomy Arpaly analyzes the concept of autonomy and argues that there 
are roughly eight different kinds of autonomy that people are commonly 
referring to.  I have summarized them below: 
1. Agent autonomy.  This refers to the agent’s ability to choose 
between various motivational states, and can be equated with self-
control or self-governance. 
2. Personal Efficacy-Material independence.  This is the general ability 
to get along in the world without help, in material matters.  
3. Personal Efficacy-Psychological independence.  This is the general 
ability to get along in the world without help in psychological 
matters. 
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4. Normative, moral autonomy.  This is the freedom to make one’s 
own decisions and the freedom from paternalistic intervention. 
5. Authenticity.  This refers to the idea of being true to oneself 
(Frankfurt), and that there is a ‘real self’ or personal identity. 
6. Self-identification.  This is described as someone who has a 
harmonious and coherent self-image that never experiences her 
desires as an external threat. 
7. Heroic Autonomy.  These are ideal concepts of autonomy such as 
Spinoza’s freedom, Aristotle’s life of contemplation, Freud or 
Jung’s ideas of liberation, and Nietzsche’s ideal of free spirit. 
8. Response to Reasons.  This is the kind of autonomy that allows one 
to act rationally and to respond to reasons in general and moral 
reasons, and includes Kant’s concept of rational autonomy.73  
This sketch of the different kinds of autonomy emphasized that there are 
different perspectives on how to define the concept, and some of these 
kinds overlap in various ways.  Arpaly argues that none of these 
conceptions of autonomy properly apply to nonhuman animals, as she 
endorses the ‘agent-autonomy’ view, which requires that an agent can 
decide on which of her motivational states she wants to follow.74  She 
believes that autonomy at any level requires a certain degree of reflection 
and deliberation that animals do not have, as they are unable to act as a 
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result of moral reasons.  That is not to say that animals never act as a 
result of reasons, but as they do not act from moral reasons, they should 
not be included as autonomous creatures.  For her, there may be other 
reasons for treating animals morally, but they are not related to 
autonomy.75  This view maintains the common view of autonomy that 
includes only humans. 
 Discussions of the importance of autonomy tend to assume that 
only humans are autonomous agents in virtue of their rational capacities 
to reflect on their goals, desires, and decisions.  It is also assumed that 
autonomy requires the capacity for high-level mental representations, 
memory and imagination that allow a person to both remember their past 
and anticipate their future.76  Only under these conditions can free 
choices be made, according to many.  Although there is no consensus on 
the meaning or conditions of autonomy, it is described in such a way as 
to fit the purpose of the moral argument it is found in.  The following 
describes perhaps the most common understanding of autonomy: 
Autonomy, in the sense fundamental to the idea of  
human rights, is a complex assumption about the  
capacities, developed or undeveloped, of persons,  
which enable them to develop, want to act on, and  
act on higher-order plans of action which take their  
self-critical object one’s life and the way it is lived.   
As Frankfurt put it, persons “are capable of wanting  
to be different, in their preferences and purposes,  
from what they are.  Many animals appear to  
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have the capacity for…’first-order desires’ or  
‘desires of the first order,’ which are simple desires  
to do or not do one thing or another.  No animal  
other than man, however, appears to have the  
capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is  
manifested in the formation of second-order desires.”   
These capacities enable persons to establish  
various kinds of priorities and schedules for the  
satisfaction of first-order desires.77 
 
Animals are denied autonomy on this account as they are believed to lack 
the ability for reflective evaluation of their actions and choices.  Instead, 
most would describe animals as ‘acting on instinct’ without the ability to 
regulate their own behaviours.  This makes sense given the history of 
science that for many years denied animals the ability to think or feel.78  
Although many people would be hesitant now to deny animals these 
abilities, there is still a great reluctance to attribute intentional mental 
states to animals as well as the capacity for autonomous action.  Because 
of the common connection between personhood and autonomy, and the 
connection between personhood and legal rights, the consequences of 
accepting animals as autonomous would have profound effects on the 
ways we treat and legislate protection for animals.   
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While it is true that many humans possess autonomy in a rich 
sense that includes life goals and second-order desires, it does not mean, 
as I have argued above, that autonomy does not exist in a more minimal 
sense among animals.  R. G. Frey argues that the attempts that have been 
made to include beings other than humans into the moral class of 
autonomy illustrates the moral privilege that we associate with being 
autonomous.79  Although Frey does not endorse cruelty towards animals, 
he believes that autonomy is irrelevant in explaining why we should avoid 
causing animals suffering, and that animals are not autonomous in any 
way.  He does believe that autonomy indicates the value of a life, and so 
when it comes to killing, the fact that animals are not autonomous 
(according to him) is relevant, as it means that, “…the threshold for 
killing animals is lower than that for killing normal humans…”80  After 
admitting that autonomy is understood in many different ways, he 
endorses a view that he calls ‘autonomy as control’, which focuses on 
being able to control our first-order desires in the attempt to shape our 
own lives in accordance with our conception of the good life.81  He writes:   
For it enables us to live our lives as we see fit and to  
make of them what we will; it becomes, then, a means  
to that rich full life of self-fulfillment and achievement,  
quite apart from any satisfaction and fulfillment that  
comes through the satisfaction of our appetites, that  
so separates men from animals.  When we look back and  
say of a human being that he led a rich, full life, we  
allude to something incomparably beyond that to  
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which we would allude, were we to say the same  
thing of a chicken or a dog.  And autonomy is a key  
to this notion of a life of accomplishment and  
self-fulfillment, lived according to one’s conception  
of the good life.82 
 
For Frey, only full persons are autonomous, and so infant humans and 
those who are “seriously defected” along with animals, are excluded from 
this moral category.83  In fact, his claim is that those people who are 
autonomous have more value, or moral weight, than those who do not.  
As such, he is very much in opposition to animal rights or the 
comparison of animals to humans on egalitarian grounds as he maintains 
a strict division between autonomous and non-autonomous beings.  
However, if we consider the idea that many humans are not fully 
autonomous, such as addicts or the mentally ill, does that push them out 
of the autonomous category, or does it just make them less autonomous 
than those who are more rational?  It is not clear why his view of control 
autonomy is more valuable than say, the preference autonomy view of 
Tom Regan, and it also seems that despite his emphasis on autonomy as 
an all-or-nothing category, this simply is not the case for humans.   
Regardless, the important question here is whether or not some 
forms of autonomy are more important or valuable than others.  Are our 
moral obligations greater towards those who possess the ability to 
achieve authenticity, than those who are capable of personal efficacy?  
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What reasons might we have for valuing some forms of autonomy over 
others?  It is not clear from this sketch how each form of autonomy 
ought to be valued, or to what extent it ought to be respected.  It simply 
lays out, more specifically, the ways that people have conceived of 
freedom in various philosophies, and emphasizes the common view that 
humans are unique in possessing autonomy. 
 
Two Levels of Autonomy 
Notions of autonomy quite often represent what are considered to 
be the distinguishing and unique features of human nature, which 
include a complex level of rational, reflective thought, higher order 
desires to shape ourselves into morally virtuous people, and the freedom 
to act as a result of our ‘true’ selves.  This ‘rich’ view of autonomy grants 
humans special moral status, as agents who can freely choose among 
alternative possibilities and who are responsible for their actions.  Most 
animals would clearly not count as autonomous on this view.   
But, I propose that just as there are both ‘rich’ and ‘basic’ levels of 
self, so too are there ‘rich’ and ‘basic’ levels of autonomy.  These different 
levels of autonomy result in different kinds of moral treatment.  If we 
only assume the ‘rich’ level of autonomy, which is characterized as 
reflective, rational thought, then the majority of animals would remain 
outside the scope of moral concern.  What I am arguing for here is a more 
‘basic’ level of autonomy, that correlates with the ‘basic’ selfhood I have 
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presented above.  It is in virtue of this ‘basic’ level of autonomy that we 
have moral obligations towards animals.  The degree to which a being is 
autonomous ought to be respected a fully as possible, and the degree to 
which a being is self-aware indicates how autonomous it is.  Specific 
traits and interests would vary according to species membership, and we 
would need to evaluate species individually to determine the level of 
autonomy possessed by an individual and the ways we can best respect 
it. 
Steven M. Wise has made one such attempt to support the notion of 
degrees of autonomy by creating a ‘scale of practical autonomy’, where 
one can assign ‘autonomy values’ to animals creating four categories, 
each of which requires different levels of moral and legal treatment.84  He 
posits that ‘practical autonomy’ entails basic liberty rights when a 
creature can desire, can try to fulfill its desires through intentional 
action, and possesses an awareness, even minimally, of itself and that its 
desires belong it.  Consciousness and sentience are required in order to 
possess practical autonomy, but no level of reflective evaluation of one’s 
preferences is needed.85  In Category One, he places animals that are self-
aware and that can pass mirror self-recognition tests, as he believes this 
justifies the belief that they have part or all of a theory of mind, and that, 
“…they understand symbols, use a sophisticated language or language-
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like communication system, and may deceive, pretend, imitate, and solve 
complex problems.”86  Category Two includes animals that have a simpler 
sense of self, and who can simply make choices among their options for 
acting.  This category is broad, and animals within this category will have 
varying liberty rights (in terms of strength) based on taxonomic class 
and, “…the nearness of her evolutionary relationship to humans.”87  
Where animals are placed in Category Two is also dependent on their 
mental and cognitive capacities.  Category Three includes animals that we 
do not know enough about to dismiss as conscious, and Category Four 
includes animals that we believe lack all consciousness, and who are 
remote from humans on a taxonomic and evolutionary scale. 88   
Although Wise is making this particular argument to support the 
idea of legal rights for animals, it is useful for highlighting the relation 
between consciousness and autonomy and the idea that they exist in 
varying degrees among animals.  There is no denial here that humans can 
have a more complex level of autonomy that includes life plans and goals 
or moral agency.  However, as Wise points out, many humans do not act 
as a result of rational reflection and what I have called the ‘common’ 
conception of autonomy.  It’s very difficult to claim that humans act as a 
result of reason and not desire, and in the courtroom, according to Wise, 
“Judges accept the nonrational determination of Jehovah’s Witnesses to 
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die rather than accept blood transfusions.  The mentally ill are not 
usually confined against their wishes unless they pose a threat to 
themselves or others.”89  As such, Wise claims, the reality for moral and 
political philosophers, as well as for judges, is that ‘lesser autonomies’ do 
exist, and all that is required of someone to be considered autonomous is 
the ability to make choices and to act in ways to satisfy her own 
preferences.  This is true even if the person is unable to evaluate their 
own choices, or evaluate them very well.90 
Autonomy can be taken to mean the freedom to direct one’s 
actions towards attaining goods recognized as such by a self-aware 
creature.  Self-awareness is what allows a creature to recognize things 
that matter to itself.  It is in virtue of having a self, in terms of having a 
‘self-directedness’, that a creature can direct its actions and intentions 
towards attaining certain goals.  The importance of autonomy for animal 
ethics is that it indicates the need to consider how we can respect both 
positive freedoms as well as negative freedoms.  According to moral 
theories in general, the absence of pain or suffering is not enough 
because autonomy asks us to also consider the positive freedoms of an 
individual to “have a quality of life commensurate with their needs and 
dignity:  physical, psychological, social, and cultural.”91  
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Interface between Scientific Knoweldge and Legislation for Animal Rights.  In, 
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In the case of animals, these positive freedoms will be specific to 
the species and context.  Indeed, there is no one unifying characteristic or 
capacity that magically bestows moral standing on only humans, or only 
on certain animal species.  James Rachels argues that: 
 
There is no such thing as moral standing simpliciter.   
Rather, moral standing is always moral standing with  
respect to some particular mode of treatment…It is 
appropriate to direct moral consideration toward any 
individual who has any of the indefinitely long list of 
characteristics that constitute morally good reasons  
why he or she should not be treated in any of the  
various ways in which individuals may be treated… 
We would distinguish three elements:  what is done  
to the individual; the reason for doing it or not  
doing it, which connects the action to some benefit  
or harm to the individual; and the pertinent facts  
about the individual that help to explain why he or  
she is susceptible to that particular benefit or harm.92  
 
On my view, both ‘marginal’ humans and animals would possess 
autonomy in a minimal sense as opposed to normal adult humans, who 
would possess autonomy at a richer level.  Paternalism is normally 
understood to be a threat to autonomous people, as it can result in 
coercion and can compromise their ability to make free choices.  For 
those who are autonomous in the minimal sense, paternalism can be 
beneficial when applied with the goal of protecting the individual from 
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harm by others.  In this way, as Rachels points out above, an 
understanding of the degree to which an individual is autonomous can 
meet the criteria of explaining why he or she is susceptible to harms or 
benefits in ways that others are not.  That is, my view maintains the value 
of all autonomous individuals while providing a way to guide our actions 
towards them, whereas those who only endorse the rich view of 
autonomy would neglect marginal humans and animals.  In the case of a 
child or companion animal, adult humans act as guardians to protect 
their interests, while acknowledging and respecting their minimal 
autonomy at the same time. 
  
Aiming for Consistency 
 When it comes to making ethical judgments, our broad aim is 
towards consistency.  That is, we generally believe that in order to be fair, 
our ethical judgments should not be based on arbitrary prejudice or 
emotional reactions.  Instead, they should be based on rational principles 
or moral concepts that apply to certain groups.  For humans, we typically 
owe others moral obligations in virtue of certain qualities they possess, 
such as autonomy and agency.  If people possess these qualities, then we 
owe them moral obligations, and we do this to varying degrees depending 
on the complexity of these qualities as they are found in different 
individuals.  This is why the nature and extent of our moral obligations 
towards others vary, as in the differences between what we owe (morally) 
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towards other adults or towards children, or towards those who are 
intellectually disabled, etc.  What we agree on is the importance and value 
of respecting the autonomy of others when and where we find it.   
On my view, autonomy exists when an individual is an agent who 
acts on the basis of their own beliefs, desires, and preferences etc., and 
who is self-aware.  As many animals share these qualities with humans, 
as I have argued above, then we also owe them moral obligations in the 
form of respecting their autonomy.  In this way, we are acting 
consistently, in terms of our moral behaviour.  If we deny animals moral 
obligations, despite the evidence that they possess agency, self-awareness 
(even minimally) and autonomy, just as humans do, to greater or lesser 
extents, then we are simply acting inconsistently and irrationally.   
 
Autonomy and Duties 
The link between selfhood and autonomy that I am arguing for 
finds support in the work of Alan Gewirth, who provides an account of 
autonomy that is based on fundamental features of the self.  Although we 
differ profoundly in our conclusions regarding the autonomous status of 
animals, I believe this is due to an oversight on Gewirth’s part of current 
research into animal minds and selfhood, rather than a necessary 
conclusion following from his own argument.  In what follows, I will 
explain his theory of self, agency, and autonomy and in what ways it 
enriches my own view. 
 61 
Gewirth summarizes his argument into a few main claims.  For 
simplicity, his main claims are outlined below. 
(1)  “I do X for end or purpose E.” 
(2)  “E is good.” 
(3)  “My freedom and well-being are necessary goods.” 
(4)  “I must have freedom and well-being.” 
(5)  “I have rights to freedom and well-being.” (Self-Fulfillment, pp. 
81-82) 
(6)  “All other persons ought at least to refrain from removing or 
interfering with my freedom and well-being.” 
(7)  “I have rights to freedom and well-being because I am a 
prospective purposive agent.” 
(8)  “If the having of some quality Q is a sufficient condition of 
some predicate P’s belonging to some individual S, then P must also 
belong to all other subjects that have Q.” 
(9)  “All prospective purposive agents have rights to freedom and 
well-being.” 
(10)  “Act in accordance with the generic rights of your recipients 
as well as of yourself.”93    
Gewirth believes that this argument must be accepted on logical 
grounds by every rational agent, as all purposive action is a result of an 
agent acting towards the achievement of what seems ‘good’ to her.  From 
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this, he derives the supreme principle of morality stated as, “Act in 
accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself.”94  
As such, one can argue that all autonomous agents are deserving of 
rights, and this means respecting their autonomy in both negative and 
positive ways.  Negatively, agents have the right to be free from direct or 
indirect compulsions, and positively by being in control of their own 
actions through freedom of choice.   
It in is virtue of the selfhood of the agent that the supreme 
principle of morality exists at all.  “The self, person, or agent to whom the 
choices belong may be viewed as an organized system of dispositions in 
which such informed reasons are coherently interrelated with other 
desires and choices.  Insofar as a person’s behavior derives from this 
system, it is the person who controls his behavior by his unforced choice, 
so that it is voluntary.  And because it is voluntary, it constitutes part of 
the justificatory basis of the supreme principle of morality.”95  Gewirth 
describes the ‘prospective purposive agent’ as someone who simply has 
purposes she wants to fulfill.    The mere possession of purposes is 
enough to grant someone rights to the freedom to attain those purposes, 
on his account.  It is a consequence of this that as someone who desires 
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to act, you must also claim those conditions that allow you to act, and 
thus you must claim rights to autonomy.96  
Gewirth considers the application of this theory to non-human 
animals in one page, where he argues that animals lack the potentialities 
to agency, and thus they do not have the generic rights that humans do.  
He believes that animals are deserving of protection against ‘wanton 
infliction of pain’ due to the similarity of feelings of pain that animals 
share with humans.  He also argues that the freedom of animals must be 
subordinated to the freedom of humans when the rights of humans are 
infringed upon.97 It is interesting however, that in an earlier part of the 
same book, where he is describing the importance of the agent’s ability to 
control his own behavior, he explains how it is we know that the ability to 
act freely is valued by someone as an intrinsic good.  He says, “In 
addition to this instrumental value, the agent also regards his freedom as 
intrinsically good, simply because it is an essential component of 
purposive action and indeed of the very possibility of action.  This is 
shown by the fact that when he is subjected to violence, coercion, or 
physical constraint, he may react negatively, with dislike, annoyance, 
dissatisfaction, anger, hostility, outrage, or similar negative emotions, 
even when he has no further specific end in view.”98 Non-human animals 
react in just the same ways when subjected to the same constraints on 
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their behavior.  According to his own argument, if their reactions are the 
same, then they must also value their own abilities to act freely and 
without constraint.   
As I see it, it is in virtue of the shared capacity for agency, 
characteristic of self-awareness, between humans and other animals that 
provides the basis of autonomy for both.  This does not mean that they 
possess the same degree of autonomy, or that they are both moral 
agents.  For being a moral agent is not required for moral rights, even on 
Gewirth’s account.  He includes ‘marginal agents’ such as very young and 
mentally disabled humans under his rights view, as they too have desires 
and purposes that include food, drink, shelter, and companionship.  
Purposiveness is what grants these individuals full rights, even if their 
freedoms must at times be limited in order to prevent them from causing 
harm to themselves or others due to their limited capacity to rationally 
evaluate their reasons for acting in accordance with their desires.  
Gewirth accords rights to those with even the most minimal desires, such 
as newborn babies, in virtue of their purposiveness.99   
Why then, does he not see that his argument must also logically 
apply to most non-human mammals?  This is especially worrisome given 
that there are many cases where adult non-human mammals have more 
complex desires and abilities to achieve their goals than newborn babies 
or intellectually disabled human adults.  It seems that the likeliest answer 
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is simply due to his ignorance of current biological and ethological 
research into animal minds that supports the existence of self-awareness 
and intelligence.  For if he acknowledged, even at the simplest level, that 
non-human animals have desires and purposes, then he must admit to 
their rights to freedom and autonomy in order to fulfill them.  Given my 
own view on animals and selfhood, in conjunction with Gewirth’s theory 
of autonomy, animals must be autonomous in virtue of their 
‘purposiveness’.  On this point we would disagree.  However, I do agree 
with Gewirth that given this selfhood and autonomy, animals are thus 
deserving of rights, in the same ways humans are.  We simply cannot 
deny these rights, based on minimal agency, as a result of speciesism or 
homocentrism, without being guilty of logical inconsistency.  The extent 
to which we must sometimes restrict certain freedoms of both human 
and non-human animals for their own safety, would be determined in 
similar fashion, as it would be based on the level of rationality and thus 
the ability to evaluate available options for action in light of the nature of 
their desires and goals.  For as we all know, sometimes the restriction of 
certain actions is in the greater good of the overall or longer term 
freedoms of an individual, even if they don’t see it that way themselves.  
In the case of animals, we would rely on the increasing body of research 
and knowledge regarding different species and their respective traits to 
guide us towards actions that would best respect their freedoms. 
 
 66 
A Naturalized View of Autonomy 
A more ‘naturalized’ account of autonomy that is grounded in the 
idea of the evolutionary continuity between humans and animals does 
not require robust notions of reflective, rational agency to establish the 
moral importance of animals who have a ‘basic’ sense of self.  One such 
view, as developed by Bruce Waller, argues that autonomy can be 
understand as autonomy-as-alternatives, whereby alternative possibilities 
for action are a result of options provided by the natural environment 
around us.  Rather than choices being explained by a mysterious 
uncaused self-willing independent of environmental factors, Waller 
argues that as animals are products of their environment, their choices 
are shaped by the available options available to them.  He describes 
autonomy-as-alternatives in this way: 
We do not want freedom for choices with no  
causal antecedents, freedom from all environmental  
contingencies, freedom to make inexplicable  
choices.  To the contrary,…we (humans and  
white-footed mice) want to be able to be able to  
act otherwise if we choose otherwise; that is, we  
want other options available when we experience  
different circumstances in our changing  
environment…The choice made is the result  
of complex environmental influences, including  
the long-term environmental history that shaped  
the species to occasionally explore different paths.   
The choice nonetheless meets the white-footed  
mouse autonomy requirements:  not a choice  
independent of all natural influences, but instead  
one of many open alternatives that can be followed  
in a changing environment under ‘different  
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circumstances.’100   
 
For Waller, the difference between human and animal autonomy is 
based on the capacity for abstract reasoning, which allows humans to 
identify a wider range of alternative possibilities for action presented in 
their environment. This is the ‘rich’ sense of autonomy here, and it 
explains why such importance has been placed on the reflective 
capacities of humans who are able to anticipate such things as the 
possible consequences of their actions, hopes for the future, goal-setting, 
etc.  This ‘rich’ sense of autonomy correlates with the ‘rich’ level of 
selfhood, where a person can reflect on the kind of person they are or 
desire to be, and direct their actions and choices in accordance with the 
possibilities their environment affords them in order to achieve their 
goals. 
Most animals that possess the ‘basic’ level of selfhood are 
autonomous in their actions as they are able to choose between the 
alternative paths provided in their environments.  The more complex the 
level of selfhood a species has, the more alternatives they are able to 
recognize in their environment.  Social animals, for example, exhibit more 
complex patterns of behaviours and wider ranges of emotions as a result 
of their cognitive capacities.  For example, if an experiment is being 
performed on a dog where she is subjected to an invasive surgical 
procedure, and where a would is left open for better observation, she will 
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be restricted in her movements and she will not be allowed to play or 
interact with other dogs.  Her physical pain is alleviated by medications.  
From this experiment, we can see that the dog’s possibilities for action 
are limited and restrict the interests she has in the freedom to act 
socially, for example.  This would most likely lead to boredom and 
abnormal repetitive behaviours, which are considered to be accurate 
indicators of emotional suffering.  It is not just that she is free from 
physical suffering that is morally relevant, but also that her autonomy to 
positively fulfill her interests and preferences, as a member of a social 
species, have been greatly reduced by those performing the experiment.  
Restricting available options for animals to act by restricting their 
environments is one way that humans can disrespect autonomy in 
animals, as it limits their choices. 
Some would argue that the ‘rich’ level of autonomy is the only kind 
of autonomy worth caring about or worth respecting in others.  Surely, 
some would say that having one’s goals in life restricted by others is 
worse than being locked in a cage.  What is mistaken here is the 
assumption that we should only value the ‘rich’ level of autonomy and 
not the ‘basic’ level of autonomy.  We do value the ‘basic’ level of 
autonomy in ourselves, perhaps even more so than the richer level as it is 
required for us to have the luxury of increased options for action.  That 
is, the basic options for action are needed prior to and in order for richer 
options to be available to us.  If I am locked in a cage, or starving, or 
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deprived of all social contact, then my basic level of autonomy has been 
violated, and I am unable to act on alternative possibilities in the richer 
sense because they are simply not available to me.  Indeed, the suffering 
caused by restrictions on my basic needs can be far worse than 
restrictions placed on my richer interests.   
 
Obligations Towards Animals 
To respect the autonomy of animals, we would need to make some 
radical changes to our current treatments of them.  To determine how we 
ought to treat animals that are already kept in captivity (in zoos, for 
example), we would have to begin by learning about the kind of animal 
self we are concerned with, and to what extent they are self-aware.  For 
example, in the case of a captive dolphin, we would need to gather and 
analyze research on dolphin mentality in order to better understand what 
kinds of interests dolphins have, so that we can have an account of the 
dolphin self.  This will allow us to identify the level of autonomy dolphins 
have, so that we can act in ways that respect that autonomy.   
For example, a utilitarian view would suggest that as long as the 
dolphin is free from pain, and has its needs for survival met, then there is 
no moral problem involved in its captivity.  On my view, in order to 
respect the autonomy of the dolphin, it would require such things as a 
variety of different natural environments, much larger containment areas, 
and much greater opportunities for social interactions with other 
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dolphins than currently exist.  It would also mean that its interests could 
not be overridden by human interests as easily as they are now, for just 
as we do not believe it is right to override the autonomy of other humans 
for reasons that are unnecessary, such as for entertainment, or economic 
gain, where someone is used merely as a means to one’s own end.  In the 
case of dolphins, this would mean that it is not acceptable to capture 
dolphins and keep them in captivity merely as a means for our own 
entertainment.101  To do so would be to disrespect the autonomy of wild 
dolphins to live their lives without harmful human interference. 
To study the minds of animals also raises questions of autonomy, 
as many experiments are performed in laboratories under ‘unnatural’ 
conditions.  Not only does this affect the results of such studies, but it 
can also harm the autonomy of these animals by the restrictions place on 
their natural behaviours.  On my view, the practices of cognitive ethology, 
which consist mainly of observing animals’ behaviours in natural 
settings, would be preferred to experiments in laboratories as it best 
respects the autonomy of animals by allowing them the freedom to act 
according to their own desires.   If required, animals kept in captivity for 
experimental purposes should be provided with the most freedom 
possible, in terms of their living environment and behaviours.  If this is 
not possible, then the experiments should not occur. 
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For domesticated animals, such as companion animals and ‘pets’, 
respecting their autonomy would consist in allowing them to make their 
own choices to the greatest extent possible.  This can be difficult to 
navigate as these animals live within human environments where such 
behaviours as scenting furniture or dragging killed prey are not 
appreciated.  However, by understanding the kinds of desires and 
preferences that dogs have, for example, can allow for accommodations 
within the home that respect their autonomy.  Providing opportunities for 
running, socializing with other dogs, playing, etc., demonstrates this 
respect, as these are the kinds of things does require for well-being and 
good health.  
Respecting autonomy in animals does not necessarily mean 
granting full legal rights to them, but it does mean much more careful 
thinking about what kinds of choices are available to them as a result of 
their mental capacities, and how we need to alter our own actions to best 
respect the autonomy they have to make those choices.  For many, this 
would be difficult as beliefs about animals as objects or merely 
possessions is so deeply ingrained into our human culture.  One can also 
be skeptical about the ability of humans to respect autonomy at all, given 
the violence and abuse that abounds in society.  However, it is a moral 
ideal and ethical goal to strive towards that as I have argued, is 
supported by strong arguments and evidence. 
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Conclusion 
Autonomy is the morally valuable feature of a self-aware creature.  
Autonomy would not exist if there were no capacity for phenomenal self-
awareness or self-consciousness.  This is because self-awareness is what 
allows for creatures to identify with their own desires and preferences, or 
interests.  This also means that potential options for action matter to 
self-aware creatures, because they allow for choice, and the freedom to 
choose among alternate possibilities without restriction or constraint. 
 Greater levels of self-awareness create more complex desires and 
preferences through rational reflection, so there will be more factors to 
consider when attempting to respect the autonomy of a human as 
opposed to that of a mouse, for example.  But, in both cases, it is still 
correct to refer to each creature as autonomous.  The preference of the 
mouse could simply be to follow one route to its food source rather than 
another, while the preference of a human could be to study philosophy 
rather than psychology at University.  In both cases, actions taken to limit 
these options, or force one path upon each creature rather than the 
alternative to what they desire would effectively reduce the autonomy of 
each.  Not all humans share the same level of autonomy.  Certainly some 
primates, for example, would have a richer level of autonomy than 
severely intellectually disabled humans.  But as long as there is self-
awareness, even in some basic form, autonomy would still exist for these 
humans as well.   
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Why should we care about the autonomy of the mouse at all?  
Simply because we value freedom, and we believe that we ought to 
respect autonomy where and when we find it.  We believe that it is a good 
for a creature to pursue its own ends to the greatest extent possible.  
That is not to say that conflicts between autonomous creatures will not 
occur, or force us to choose to respect or deny autonomy for certain 
individuals in specific cases.  But the goal should be to respect and/or 
increase the opportunities to exercise autonomy when possible.   
In the next chapter I will consider attempts made by other 
philosophers in animal ethics to provide arguments in favour of the 
moral considerability of animals.  By doing so, I will demonstrate that the 
inadequacies of their views can be strengthened by the inclusion of the 
selfhood that animals possess.  Although my own view and theirs share 
some common reasoning, the foundations for moral obligations towards 
animals differ in important ways.  
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Chapter Three:  Other Views of Animal Ethics 
 
Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, I have argued that what makes an 
animal morally considerable is the capacity for selfhood, and that the 
degree to which an animal is self-aware indicates the corresponding 
degree of autonomy that we ought to respect with regard to our 
treatment of them.  My approach is not dissimilar to other philosophers 
who take a ‘capacity orientation’ to the study of animal ethics.102  This is 
due to the difficulty of identifying what makes anyone morally 
considerable, animal or human.  Regardless of which moral theory you 
choose, it will inevitably conclude that certain capacities are what 
distinguish the moral significance between rocks and dogs, or dolphins 
and humans.   
Just as I have argued that selfhood and autonomy are the most 
morally relevant features of individuals, so too have other philosophers 
focused on certain capacities that humans and other animals share.  
However, in this chapter I will argue that my own account, with its 
inclusion of current research into consciousness and autonomy, more 
thoroughly and accurately addresses why animals are morally 
considerable and to what extent we owe individuals from different 
species fewer or greater moral obligations.  Specifically, I will examine a 
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utilitarian view and two rights views that are the most dominant in the 
study of animal ethics currently.  These views are best represented by the 
arguments of Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Bernard Rollin, respectively. 
As well as providing a general summary of each of these 
philosopher’s arguments in favour of the moral consideration of animals, 
I will focus on a few particular questions.  These include:  What capacity 
makes animals morally considerable?  To what extent do we owe animals 
moral consideration based on this capacity?  What kinds of conceptual 
and practical problems result from each view, and how does my account 
provide a better solution to each problem?103 
 
Peter Singer and Utilitarianism 
Peter Singer’s theory of animal ethics is an extension of the 
principle of the equal consideration of interests, particularly as it is 
found in utilitarianism, to non-human animals.  This principle requires us 
to take into consideration the interests of all those affected by our 
actions regardless of our personal characteristics when we making ethical 
judgments.  Equality is an important feature of Singer’s view of 
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utilitarianism, and this principle provides an objective way to weigh the 
interests of everyone without personal bias.104    
Singer is a preference utilitarian, whereby an individual’s 
preferences, in the form of interests, are to be considered by others when 
making moral decisions.  This means that according to this theory, we 
ought to weigh the interests of all those involved, and determine who 
stands to be harmed or benefited by the action in question, so that our 
action will bring about the least amount of suffering and greatest amount 
of pleasure for all those affected.  In order to treat everyone equally, we 
ought to consider the interests of all those affected without prejudice; 
that is, there is no good reason, according to Singer, to place more value 
or weight on the interests of one person over another.  This is the 
importance of the principle of equal consideration of interests.  It allows 
for a non-biased evaluation of interests that is not dependent on such 
features as race, religion, gender, or in this case, species.  Singer writes: 
The essence of the principle of equal consideration  
of interests is that we give equal weight in our  
moral deliberations to the like interests of all those  
affected by our actions.  This means that if only X  
and Y would be affected by a possible act, and if X  
stands to lose more than Y stands to gain, it is better  
not to do the act…What the principle really amounts  
to is this:  an interest is an interest, whoever’s interest  
it may be.105 
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The last line above is most important to the application of this 
principle to animals, because it means that the only interests that matter 
are those based on the capacity to suffer or experience pleasure.  These 
interests are not determined by race, gender, or species, as the capacity 
to suffer is not dependent on these traits.  That is not to say that the 
causes of suffering are not related to these traits, as we know that 
racism, sexism, or speciesism can cause suffering specific to those who 
possess these traits.  It simply means that the capacity to suffer and to 
experience pleasure is shared features of most animals, both human and 
non-human, and that they are interests worthy of moral consideration.  
Whether animals have interests beyond these are a matter of debate, and 
are dependent on the characteristics of specific species, for Singer. 
When Singer applies the principle of equal consideration of 
interests to animals, he begins by quoting a passage by Jeremy Bentham 
that foresees the application of utilitarianism to animals as well as 
humans.  This passage is worth quoting, as it provides such a clear 
explanation of the importance of sentience for moral consideration.  
Bentham wrote: 
The day may come when the rest of the animal  
creation may acquire those rights which never  
could have been withholden from them but by  
the hand of tyranny.  The French have already  
discovered that the blackness of the skin is no  
reason why a human being should be abandoned  
without redress to the caprice of a tormentor.   
It may one day come to be recognized that the  
number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or  
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the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons  
equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive  
being to the same fate.  What else is it that should  
trace the insuperable line?  Is it the faculty of  
reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse?  But a  
fullgrown horse or dog is beyond comparison a  
more rational, as well as a more conversable animal,  
than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month,  
old.  But suppose they were otherwise, what would  
it avail?  The question is not, Can they reason? Nor  
Can they talk?  but, Can they suffer?106   
 
Here, Bentham argues that just as skin color has been rejected as a 
barrier to moral consideration based on suffering, so too will species 
membership be rejected as a barrier to moral consideration based on 
suffering, as any being capable of feeling is also capable of being 
tormented by those with more power.  This capacity for sentience 
becomes the foundation for Singer’s more developed argument that 
animals are morally equal to humans in terms of the consideration of 
their interests for suffering and enjoyment.  Sentience is the basis for all 
moral consideration, for Singer, as it is the necessary condition for the 
possession of interests at all.  Singer argues that “The capacity for 
suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, 
a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any 
meaningful way…If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification 
for refusing to take that suffering into consideration.”107   
Because sentience underlies all other interests, and the weighing of 
interests is the basis of utilitarian decision-making, sentience is “…the 
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only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others.”108 As 
many non-human animals are sentient, the principle of equal 
consideration of interests applies to them in the same way it applies to all 
humans.   Indeed, those who refuse to consider animals under this 
principle of equality for no other reason than giving preference to the 
interests of members of their own species are referred to as ‘speciesists’ 
by Singer, which denotes its similarity to ‘racism’ and ‘sexism’.  This 
simply means that when we give weight to the interests of certain 
sentient beings based on traits that are irrelevant to the capacity to 
suffer, we are acting in an unjustifiably biased way.109  In the case of 
animals, the belief that humans are more intelligent or more spiritually 
valuable than non-human animals and therefore have the right to treat 
animals without any moral consideration is wrong and speciesist.  This is 
because it denies the moral importance of suffering and enjoyment as the 
basis of all other interests for both humans and animals.   
It is important to note that the principle of equal consideration of 
interests does not necessarily result in equal treatment, and that in each 
case the amount of suffering of all those involved would need to be 
measured and compared in order to conclude who is suffering most.  
Priority must be given to whoever is suffering most under the 
circumstances, whether human or non-human animal.  Although the 
capacity to suffer itself is not usually the most concerning issue or 
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problem under this theory, the amount of suffering may be affected by 
other capacities that differ between species.  Singer argues “…that we 
must take care when we compare the interests of different species”110 and 
that, “there are many areas in which the superior mental powers of 
normal adult humans make a difference:  anticipation, more detailed 
memory, greater knowledge of what is happening, and so on…it is the 
mental anguish that makes the human’s position so much harder to 
bear.”111 These cognitive capacities increase one’s ability to suffering 
mentally and emotionally in ways that other humans with diminished 
mental capacities may not, or that other species may not possess at all or 
may possess but in lesser degree.  Singer states that in some cases 
animals may suffer more than humans because of their limited capacity 
to understand the situation that they are in.  His response to the concern 
that it is impossible to know and compare the suffering of different 
species is that, “…precision is not essential” so long as the total quantity 
of suffering is reduced in the universe by treating animals in ways that 
would reduce or eliminate their suffering even if the interests of humans 
are not affected at all.112  
Singer’s arguments have had an undeniable impact on the moral 
status of animals in society, and he has successfully argued that the 
capacity to suffer is what makes animals morally considerable, and that 
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this trait is shared with humans.  He believes that on the whole, we ought 
to reduce the use of animals in experiments that cause suffering, and 
that we should adopt a vegetarian diet.  However, Singer’s view does not 
go far enough in terms of the full range of moral obligations we owe 
animals in virtue of their interests, agency and selfhood.  I will argue that 
this weakness relates to the omission of personhood and autonomy, and 
the problems that arise as a result of the aggregation of interests that 
occur in all forms of utilitarian calculus. 
Although Singer advocates for the cessation of eating animals on 
the grounds that current factory farming methods create an overall 
increase in aggregate suffering in the world, he admits that the 
‘replaceability argument’ justifies the killing of animals under certain 
conditions.  For example, if chickens are killed painlessly and replaced by 
other chickens who would otherwise not have existed, who themselves go 
on to live pleasurable lives, then there is nothing wrong with killing 
chickens.113  This justification of killing is entailed by his view of persons 
and non-persons.  For Singer,  
A self-conscious being is aware of itself as a  
distinct entity, with a past and a future…A  
being aware of itself in this way will be capable  
of having desires about its own future.  For  
example, a professor of philosophy may hope  
to write a book demonstrating the objective  
nature of ethics; a student may look forward to  
graduating; a child may want to go for a ride in  
an aeroplane.  To take the lives of any of these  
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people without their consent, is to thwart their  
desires for the future.  Killing a snail or a day-old  
infant does not thwart any desires of this kind,  
because snails and newborn infants are incapable  
of having such desires.114   
 
As the principle of the equal consideration of interests specifies 
that we weigh like interests equally, those with more interests, due to 
capacities like valuing the future will easily outweigh those who do not 
even have a concept of the future.  Applied to animals, this means that 
the majority of animals are not considered to be persons by Singer, and 
thus it is not nearly as morally wrong to kill an animal as it is to kill a 
human in the majority of relevant cases.  Ultimately, Singer’s argument 
does not entail that we stop eating animals, even under current farming 
practices, as the benefits for humans that also include financial ones, in 
addition to gustatory pleasures, and acting primarily in the interests of 
human ‘persons’ will almost always outweigh acting in the interests of 
other animals.115 
Another problem with Singer’s argument concerns the omission of 
autonomy as the grounds for moral consideration.  Consider the 
following example:  If we were to include both human and non-human 
animals in an experiment, controlling any pain or suffering for both, and 
the results were of great benefit to a larger populace, then we would have 
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to ask if anything wrong or immoral is happening here.  Singer would 
argue that as long as suffering is reduced, and greater happiness is 
created, then there is nothing morally wrong here.  However, if we 
recognize that the humans were able to provide informed consent to be 
subjects in the experiment, but the non-human animals were not, there 
seems to be a problem.  This problem, I believe, can only be explained 
fully by introducing the notion of autonomy.   
When we ask for informed consent, we are doing so in order to 
respect the autonomy someone has over his or her own choices.  We 
believe that a person should not be forced or manipulated by deception 
into making a decision because of their right to freedom, both positive 
and negative.  If someone is aware of all the risks of an experiment, and 
chooses freely to consent to participate in the experiment then we accept 
that their decision is autonomous, and thus morally acceptable.  In the 
case of non-human animals, however, they cannot consent to participate 
in the experiment, because they cannot understand the risks or benefits 
involved.  Many would argue that because non-human animals cannot do 
this, they are not autonomous.  Therefore, we only need to concern 
ourselves with their suffering, and as long as we control or eliminate any 
suffering, there is no moral harm being committed. 
Autonomy, for Singer, only properly belongs to ‘persons’ who are 
self-aware, rational, and who possess the ability to imagine a future.  He 
not only denies that most animals possess these traits, but he also argues 
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that autonomy is not valuable in itself, but only as one of many other 
interests.  For example, Singer states that “Utilitarians do not respect 
autonomy for its own sake, although they might give great weight to a 
person’s desire to go on living, either in a preference utilitarian way, or as 
evidence that the person’s life was on the whole a happy one.”116  He 
believes that autonomy is a useful concept that we can choose to respect 
if we wish to, as it generally leads to overall good consequences for 
people when respected.117  But, because on his view, we only need to 
consider like interests equally, the human and non-human animal in the 
experiment differ because the interest of autonomy only applies to the 
human, and not to the non-human animal (as the animal is not likely a 
‘person’).  Singer’s view, while it advocates for the reduction of suffering, 
does not provide grounds for respecting the interests in well-being or 
flourishing that non-human animals have other than increasing overall 
pleasure and reducing suffering for the aggregate whole.118   
One reason for Singer’s denial of ascribing autonomy to animals is 
a result of his conception of what autonomy actually is.  Singer states 
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that autonomy is the ability to choose between and act upon one’s own 
decisions.  He says that, “Rational and self-conscious beings presumably 
have this ability, whereas beings who cannot consider the alternatives 
open to them are not capable of choosing in the required sense and 
hence cannot be autonomous.”119  He believes that while non-human 
animals are conscious, the majority of them are not self-conscious or 
rational, and so only their ability to experience pleasure and pain are 
morally relevant.  While this view of autonomy is shared among many, 
there are more naturalized accounts that include both human and non-
human animals, as I have argued in chapter two, and which I will further 
support in chapter four through an analysis of a Kantian view. 
Finally, any version of utilitarianism is subject to criticism based on 
the methods used to obtain the morally right answer to an ethical 
dilemma.  Utilitarian calculus, regardless of the specific units of 
measurement, can often favour the interests of the many, or the whole, to 
the detriment of the few, or the one.  The objection runs like this:   
 
According to utilitarianism, the aim of moral  
action is to bring about, or make likely, the best  
total balance of good over bad consequences—of  
pleasure over pain according to classical  
utilitarianism, of satisfaction over frustration of  
preferences according to the contemporary  
version for which Singer himself in the end opted.   
A fundamental objection to this all-inclusive  
calculation is that it doesn’t sufficiently take into  
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account the separateness of individuals.120 
 
For humans, this results in the possibility that severely disabled 
infants, for example, could be experimented on if the benefits for the 
common good outweigh the suffering of the infants.  Singer has been 
criticized for these implications of his argument, and has responded by 
saying that all this shows is that his view is truly anti-speciesist.  For 
animals, it means that if the satisfaction of preferences for humans to eat 
or experiment on animals outweighs the suffering of the animals, then it 
is morally acceptable to do so.  This is not to say Singer by any means 
endorses cruelty to animals, but rather that he is unable to provide 
reasons that are directly based on his own arguments to counter these 
problems.  These are simply the logical implications of Singer’s view:   
Rodeos give much pleasure to a great number  
of people, so that the aggregate of pleasure for  
the humans is surely greater than the total of  
pain caused to relatively few animals.  Much  
the same reasoning would remove the usual  
objection to zoos.  And for all of his misgivings,  
Singer has to admit, however reluctantly, that 
experimentation on animals cannot be excluded  
altogether.121 
 
On my account, respect for autonomy means that individuals and small 
groups cannot have their interests overridden for the greater good.  
Cases where we might override someone’s autonomy would include harm 
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to themselves or potential harm to others, and this would only occur 
under very serious and exceptional circumstances.122  The best way to 
support this view is to adopt Kant’ s second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative (which I will argue for in chapter four) whereby 
individuals must not be treated merely as a means to someone else’s 
ends.  In utilitarianism, there is no protection against such use, and as 
such, Singer’s view does not provide a strong enough foundation for 
direct moral obligations towards animals, or for individuals more 
broadly. 
 
Tom Regan, Inherent Value, and Rights 
Tom Regan rejects the Utilitarian view of animals due to his 
concern that it does not account for the value an individual has 
regardless of their interests.  For Regan, inherent value means that 
individuals have value in themselves, and that they are not reducible to 
the value attached to their experiences, preferences, or interests.  Regan 
argues that, “They have value in their own right, a value that is distinct 
from, not reducible to, and incommensurate with the values of those 
experiences which, as receptacles, they have or undergo.”123 He compares 
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this view of inherent value to that of utilitarian value through a cup 
analogy, saying: 
On the receptacle view of value, is what goes into  
the cup (the pleasures or preference-satisfactions,  
for example) that has value; what does not have  
value is the cup itself (i.e., the individual himself  
or herself).  The postulate of inherent value offers  
an alternative.  The cup (that is, the individual) has  
value and a kind that is not reducible to, and is 
incommensurate with, what goes into the cup (e.g., 
pleasures), but the value of the cup (individual) is  
not the same as any one or any sum of the valuable  
things the cup contains.124   
 
Inherent value, according to Regan, is a feature of all individuals 
who are a ‘subject-of-a-life’, including humans and mammals over the age 
of one year.  He specifies this because he believes that it is not simply in 
virtue of being conscious or alive (like plants) that something has 
inherent value.  Instead, subjects-of-a-life are characterized by certain 
features, namely: 
…beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a  
sense of the future, including their own future; an  
emotional life together with feelings of pleasure  
and pain; preference and welfare interests; the  
ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires  
and goals; a psychosocial identity over time; and an 
individual welfare in the sense that their experiential  
life fares well or ill for them, logically independently  
of their utility for others and logically independently  
of their being the object of anyone else’s interests.125 
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These characteristics support the view that adult mammals, 
according to Regan, are intentional agents and self-conscious.126  This is 
because when we observe and analyze the behaviours of animals it is 
reasonable to interpret them as intentional, and intentional behaviours 
are only possible if a creature is self-conscious.127  When we attempt to 
‘draw the line’ between those animals that are not self-conscious and 
those who are, we are faced with difficulty.  But, according to Regan, we 
should focus on whether or not we have good reason to believe that 
“…mammalian animals not only are conscious and sentient but also have 
beliefs, desires, memory, a sense of the future, self-awareness, and an 
emotional life, and can act intentionally.”128  He concludes that we do 
have such evidence, for similar reasons to those that I explained in 
Chapter One. 
For Regan then, the problem with utilitarianism is that it only 
values individuals insofar as respecting their interests increases the 
overall utility for all involved.  The individuals themselves are not 
valuable for themselves, but only as ‘receptacles’ of interests that can be 
judged good or bad in terms of the suffering or pleasure they bring 
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about.  Regan believes that an individual is either a subject-of-a-life or 
not, depending on the relevant features described above, for “One either 
is a subject of a life, in the sense explained, or one is not.  All those who 
are, are so equally.  The subject-of-a-life criterion thus demarcates a 
categorical status shared by all moral agents and those moral patients 
with whom we are concerned.”129  If something or someone does not have 
these features, then we do not owe them direct moral obligations (like a 
blade of grass or a rock).  If someone is a subject-of-a-life, then they are 
deserving of respect and moral treatment, regardless of whether or not 
they are a moral agent or a moral patient.  All subjects-of-a-life are 
equally valuable, according to Regan, and that is why animals are 
deserving of rights equal to humans. 
Indeed, Regan calls for the complete abolition of the use of animals 
in science, agriculture, and hunting in all its forms.  He believes that 
animals should not be used for human purposes whatsoever, for any sort 
of human benefit, because the use of animals presupposes that animals 
are simply resources, with no value of their own.  If they are indeed 
individuals with inherent value, then they are equal in value to human 
individuals.130  
Regan also believes that some animals are autonomous, and he 
distinguishes between two views of autonomy; the Kantian view, and 
what Regan calls ‘preference’ autonomy.  On the Kantian view, Regan 
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argues that autonomy means being able to act on reasons that one can 
will everyone else to act on in similar circumstances, assuming that 
everyone’s reasons would be the same as my own, arrived at through 
deliberation and reflection.  To act on the basis of one’s own 
deliberations is to act autonomously.  This level of reasoning, according 
to Regan, would most likely only belong to humans, who can reflect 
impartially on their own situations and those of others.131 
Regan’s view of autonomy states that, “…individuals are 
autonomous if they have preferences and have the ability to initiate 
action with a view to satisfying them.”132  He calls this view ‘preference 
autonomy’, and believes that it does not require one to be able to reason 
abstractly about the reasons for acting.  Instead, according to Regan, “…it 
is enough that one have the ability to initiate action because one has 
those desires or goals one has and believes, rightly or wrongly, that one’s 
desires or purposes will be satisfied or achieved by acting in a certain 
way.”133  Regan believes that mammals, while not autonomous in the 
Kantian sense, are autonomous under the preference view, and that they 
possess the requisite cognitive capacities to act according to their own 
preferences.  Regan defends this view against the idea that the Kantian 
sense of autonomy is the only true sense of autonomy by arguing that 
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Kantian autonomy is only required in order to be a moral agent, rather 
than a requirement for autonomy in any sense.134     
In order to respect the autonomy of animals, we must respect the 
interests that they have, in similar ways we do with other humans.  
Specifically, Regan argues that animals, “…live well relative to the degree 
to which (1) they pursue and obtain what they prefer, (2) they take 
satisfaction in pursuing and getting what they prefer, and (3) what they 
pursue and obtain is in their interests.”135   Regan believes we ought to 
resist too much paternalism in order to respect the autonomy of 
individuals to have control over and satisfaction with the unfolding of 
their lives.  He describes the case of a captive wolf whose desire for food 
is met by being fed by his keeper, but who would be more satisfied 
through the effort and exertion required to acquire his own food.  Human 
and non-human animals that are prevented from acting autonomously 
are less satisfied and less likely to live a ‘good’ life, and thus we must 
respect the liberty of both to pursue what they prefer, assuming that 
what they prefer is in fact, good for them.136    
Regan offers more support for direct moral obligations towards 
animals than Singer does, by focusing on the value of the individual 
beyond the sum of its interests.  There are however two main conceptual 
problems with his subject-of-a-life criterion and his view of autonomy 
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that are better addressed with my own view.  Also, Regan believes that 
the implications of his own arguments necessitate an abolitionist view on 
the use of animals, which I believe is somewhat misguided and can be 
detrimental to our understanding of the relationships we have with other 
animals. 
An individual that is an experiencing subject-of-a-life, for Regan, 
must possess the full list of criteria as described above in order to qualify 
as inherently valuable and deserving of rights.  There are two problems 
with this criterion.  First, some have claimed that the specific features 
that make up this criterion are chosen in order to be able to include 
nonhuman animals and ‘marginal’ humans.  Garner suggests, “But isn’t 
this the wrong way round?  In other words, should we not be establishing 
what characteristics are essential for moral considerability before 
describing who meets the criteria we have established?  Regan points out 
that his subject-of-a-life principle explains the ‘moral sameness’ and 
‘moral equality’ between humans and animals.  But isn’t it this very moral 
equality that needs explaining in the first place?”137  This is an important 
consideration as any theory of animal ethics has implications for 
marginal cases such as young children or people with intellectual 
disabilities who are often discounted from moral consideration due to 
their lack of ‘personhood’ in the fullest sense.  To first determine what 
makes someone morally considerable at all and then examine whether or 
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not animals and marginal humans possess this quality only strengthens 
the resulting arguments and implications for acting morally.   
Pluhar similarly points out that Regan’s view that all subjects-of-a-
life are owed equal consideration and respect lies on an initial 
assumption that marginal humans are owed respect, but that he doesn’t 
actually provide an argument to support this ‘reflective intuition’.138  
Franklin adds to this criticism by pointing out that Regan also begins 
with “…the prereflective intuition that animals cannot be treated in just 
any way at all and then moves on to the idea of inherent value and the 
respect principle.”139  Once again, Regan’s starting point has not been 
justified, which makes the subject-of-a-life criterion seem somewhat 
arbitrary. 
As I have argued, minimal selfhood, agency and minimal autonomy 
are the criteria for inclusion into the moral community.  This claim 
resulted from an investigation into what makes anyone morally 
considerable at all, rather than beginning with the assumption that 
marginal humans and animals are deserving of moral treatment.  This is 
partly a result of my previous work in environmental ethics, where the 
question of how non-sentient objects, such as ‘nature’ or ‘trees’ can have 
moral standing can lead one into some absurd arguments and 
conclusions.  Regan acknowledges this problem saying, “As in the case of 
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nonconscious natural objects or collections of such objects, however, it 
must be said that it is radically unclear how the attribution of inherent 
value to these individuals can be made intelligible and nonarbitrary.”140  
But this does not mean that we automatically owe animals moral 
obligations either, as for centuries humans have included animals within 
the realm of ‘nature’, and therefore outside of the realm of moral 
consideration.  My argument, based on the notion that minimal selfhood 
is the basis for moral consideration, allows us to investigate who 
possesses this quality, and thus who should be included in the moral 
community.  Further to that, it provides us with guidance in determining 
to extent to which we owe an individual respect and moral consideration, 
which leads us to a second, and related problem with Regan’s subject-of-
a-life criterion. 
A second, and related problem with Regan’s argument is that the 
full range of mental features he includes in his criterion for a subject-of-
a-life is an all-or-nothing category, and it sets the bar very high in order 
to qualify as someone with inherent value.  This would make it difficult 
for both some marginal humans and many animal species to be deserving 
of moral consideration and rights.  Regan does anticipate this objection, 
and responds with the claim that his criterion is a sufficient, but not 
necessary condition for attributing inherent value to individuals.  It is 
possible, he claims, that comatose humans or sentient animals may not 
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possess all of the conditions of a subject-of-a-life, but may still be said to 
have inherent value.  He argues, “Since the claim is made only that 
meeting this criterion is a sufficient condition of making the attribution 
of inherent value intelligible and nonarbitrary, it remains possible that 
animals that are conscious but not capable of acting intentionally, or, say, 
permanently comatose human beings might nonetheless be viewed as 
having inherent value.”141  The focus here, for Regan, is on the idea that 
his criterion provides an intelligible and nonarbitrary standard for 
attributing inherent value to both marginal humans and animals as moral 
patients, thereby including them in the category of moral considerability 
along with moral agents.  The problem is that it is not clear why he does 
not simply argue that all sentient creatures, human or animal, are 
deserving of rights.  It is not at all apparent how a comatose human, who 
does not exhibit any of the features of his criterion could be said to have 
“a life that fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their 
utility for us or of our taking an interest in them--…”.142  Also, it does not 
assist us in determining whether or not any animals aside from adult 
mammals or birds should be owed moral consideration with any sort of 
clarity. 
On Regan’s view, anyone who fulfills his criterion for moral 
consideration is owed the same level of respect, and has equal rights to 
everyone else.  On my view, an individual is owed moral consideration to 
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the extent that they are conscious and self-aware, which makes it more 
plausible when considering the differences in moral obligations we owe 
to a fully conscious person as opposed to one who is comatose.  For 
surely we would want to argue that we owe a fully conscious person more 
consideration than a comatose one.  That is not to say that I have not 
created a category for those who deserve moral consideration in a similar 
way to Regan in that anyone who is conscious and minimally self-aware is 
morally relevant, and anything outside of that category is not morally 
relevant.   
But, my view provides a more nuanced approach to dealing with 
the degrees of mental capacities that exist among humans and between 
species.  My view maintains a clear line between objects (such as plants or 
rocks) and subjects (such as humans and animals) and allows for the 
inclusion of minimally self-aware animals to be given moral 
consideration.  Based on the extent to which a creature is self-aware, 
conscious, and able to act as an agent, we adjust the extent to which we 
respect their autonomy.  I believe this view avoids the problems Regan 
encounters when trying to justify our obligations towards marginal 
humans and animals. 
Finally, the abolitionist stance that Regan believes is a consequence 
of his rights view is problematic as it creates a false dichotomy between 
‘animal welfarists’ and ‘animal rights’ views.  He argues that if we accept 
the view that to treat all subjects-of-a-life equally, then we are committed 
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to an animal rights position that entails that any use of animals for 
human interests must be abolished.  He claims that “In my view, since the 
utilization of nonhuman animals for purposes of, among other things, 
fashion, research, entertainment, or gustatory delight harms them and 
treats as (our) resources, and since such treatment violates their right to 
be treated with respect, it follows that such utilization is morally wrong 
and ought to end.  Merely to reform such institutional injustice (by 
resolving to eat only ‘happy’ cows or to insist on larger cages, for 
example) is not enough.  Morally considered, abolition is required.”143  
Abolitionist views go further than insisting on the cessation of animals 
being used in agriculture or entertainment however, calling for the 
cessation of any use of animals at all by humans, including keeping 
animals as companions or interfering with wildlife.  Animal welfarist 
views argue for the improvement of the lives of animals used by humans, 
such as better living conditions on farms and in research.  So, on Regan’s 
view, we are left with either accepting the use of animals by humans, 
which disrespects their rights, or not using animals at all or in any way.144   
                                                
143 Regan, Tom.  2001.  Defending Animal Rights.  Chicago:  University of Illinois 
Press.  p. 43. 
144 Gary Francione also advocates for the complete abolition of the use of 
animals by humans.  He believes that we should not breed animals for any 
reason, and that we should leave wildlife alone.  Again, this is an unattainable 
goal as conflicts between humans and animals cannot be prevented when 
sharing the same planet and resources.  For further elaboration on his view, 
please see Francione, Gary L.  2008.  Animals as Persons:  Essay on the Abolition 
of Animal Exploitation.  New York:  Columbia University Press. 
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For me, this is not a reasonable position to advocate for, as there 
are many mutually beneficial relationships between humans and other 
animals whereby animals are not treating merely as a means to fulfill the 
interests of humans.  Animal-assisted therapy is one such example, where 
both the animal and human benefit from their relationship with each 
other.  Using sled dogs for transportation in northern climates is another.  
This is not to say that these relationships are never abusive towards the 
animals, but that if they are based on the kind of respect for autonomy I 
have presented in Chapter Two, then the relationship can be a morally 
good one.  The point is, there are many ways that we do interact with 
animals, and that we need moral principles to guide us in those 
interactions.  To argue that we must accept complete abolition on the use 
of animals or else fall into utterly abusive relationships with them is 
inaccurate.  In Kantian terms, as long as the other creature is treated as 
an end and not simply as someone’s means, then their autonomy can still 
be respected within a relationship where the use of one by the other is 
beneficial.  On my view, as in Regan’s, using animals purely as a means to 
satisfy our gustatory desires or to benefit from research on them is 
clearly unacceptable, as are most of the current relationships we have 
with animals for other reasons.  
Regan provides a much stronger argument in support of the direct 
moral consideration towards animals than Singer does, and my view 
coincides with his regarding the importance and moral value of 
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experiencing subjects.  However, I believe that my own view provides a 
more nuanced account of the extent to which we owe individuals moral 
consideration than Regan’s, that results in better applications and which 
more directly supports further research into animal minds.  As my own 
view is not abolitionist, I believe it encourages mutually beneficial 
relationships between humans and animals that are denied on Regan’s 
account. 
 
Bernard Rollin and Teleology 
Rollin is more in agreement with Regan’s views than with Singer’s.  He 
rejects a utilitarian view of animal ethics for the same reasons Regan 
does, namely, that individuals have value in themselves and are not 
simply receptacles of interests.  Rollin argues that animals, with interests, 
are ends in themselves, and that makes them objects of moral concern. In 
order to have interests, as opposed to simply having needs (like plants), 
conscious awareness is required.  He argues that in order for an animal to 
care about whether or not its needs are met, some kind of mental life, 
however rudimentary, is needed.  Not only are pain and pleasure 
indicators are unmet needs, but so too are “Frustration, anxiety, malaise, 
listlessness, boredom, and anger…”.145  When these kinds of emotions are 
                                                
145 Rollin, Bernard E.  2006.  Animal Rights and Human Morality.  Third Edition.  
Amherst:  Prometheus Books, p. 102. 
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demonstrated, we can be reasonably certain that the animal has interests, 
not only needs, that are not being met.146    
Rollin argues that morality is fundamentally concerned with 
respect for an individual’s interests regardless of whether it is a human 
or an animal.   He summarizes the main claims in his argument as 
follows: 
It is enough that we, as moral agents, can sensibly  
assert that the spider has interests, which are  
conditions without which the creature, first of all,  
cannot live or, second of all, cannot live its life as  
a spider, cannot fulfill its telos.  And thirdly, and  
most important, as we shall shortly discuss, it is  
necessary that that we can say sensibly of the  
animal that it is aware of its struggle to live its life,  
that the fulfilling or thwarting of its needs matter  
to it.  (Once again, we must stress that a man may  
not be conscious of his need for oxygen, but  
thwarting that need certainly matters to him.  This  
sort of talk is senseless vis-à-vis a rock.)  Further  
we are aware that it is in our power to nurture or  
impede these needs and even to destroy the entire  
nexus of needs and activities that constitute its  
life. And once this is recognized, it is difficult to  
see why the entire machinery of moral concern  
is not relevant here, for it is the awareness of  
interesting living (human) beings that we have  
argued is constitutive of morality in the first place.147  
 
He later states “Thus we have tried to argue that any living thing, insofar 
as it evidences interests, with or without the ability to suffer, is worthy of 
                                                
146 Rollin provides a list of the kinds of evidence we have for believing that 
animals are conscious, which is very similar to what I have argued for in Chapter 
One.  He includes neurophysiological, biochemical, behavioural, the presence of 
sense organs, and evolutionary theory as sources of evidence for consciousness 
in animals. 
147 Rollin, Bernard E.  1992.  Animal Rights and Human Morality.  New York:  
Prometheus Books, p. 75.  
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being an object of moral concern.  Insofar as we can inform ourselves of 
the interests of a creature, we must at least look at that creature with 
moral categories.”148 This means that when we evaluate our actions 
towards animals, we must take into consideration the interests that they 
have and whether or not we are respecting or disrespecting them.  This 
would be the same for both humans and animals, to the extent that they 
share the possession of consciousness and interests, even at the most 
minimal levels.  It does not, however, mean that all species have the same 
kinds of interests.  Rollin admits, similarly to Singer, that the more 
complex the level of awareness or consciousness that an animal has, the 
more valuable it is in terms of moral consideration and the right to life.  
Although he admits it would not be clear how to deal with conflicting 
interests, both in situations between different animals, and between 
humans and other animals.  He suggests, rather than performing a 
utilitarian calculus that we must consider each situation individually, and 
resolve it dialectically.149 
Indeed, Rollin favours a Kantian view over that of utilitarianism, as 
it supports his view that all conscious animals have intrinsic value.  Rollin 
argues that animals are ends-in-themselves, and that, “…any living thing 
with interests is an end in itself, worthy of moral consideration merely in 
virtue of its being alive.  That in turn means that even if we use another 
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149 Rollin, Bernard E.  2006.  Animal Rights and Human Morality.  Third Edition.  
Amherst:  Prometheus Books, p. 133. 
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living creature as a means, it must never be merely as a means, but we 
should always keep in mind a respect for its end, that is, its life, and the 
interests and needs associated with that life that matter to it.”150 
According to Rollin, it is not rationality that makes someone worthy of 
moral consideration, but rather it is conscious life that possesses 
interests.  This is important as for Rollin, we do not need to be 
abolitionists in order to respect the rights that animals have, as long as 
we do not treat animals merely as a means to our own ends.  For Rollin, 
this would mean that zoos are acceptable as long as animals are provided 
with an environment that allows for their interests to be met.  For 
example, giraffes should have plenty of space to stand up fully and 
stretch their necks, and social animals should never be kept in isolation.  
In this way, rights are not absolute for animals, just as they are not 
absolute for humans, as they can be overridden in certain cases.  He just 
wants to emphasize that when we do use animals, we do use with their 
intrinsic value and interests in mind.151 
Figuring out exactly what the moral obligations are towards 
animals, Rollin adds to his argument that the telos of an animal informs 
us of the specific ways in which we can respect creatures belonging to 
different species.  Telos for living animals is intrinsic to them as 
members of a particular species, or part of the genetic makeup that gives 
                                                
150 Rollin, Bernard E.  1992.  Animal Rights and Human Morality.  New York:  
Prometheus Books, p. 89. 
151 Rollin, Bernard E.  2006.  Animal Rights and Human Morality.  Third Edition.  
Amherst:  Prometheus Books, pp. 116-118. 
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members of different species their distinctive features.  This is different 
from the telos of a car or man-made object as it is extrinsic to the object 
as a result of it being conceived of and created by someone else.  For 
example, Rollin says regarding a spider, that “…it has what Aristotle 
called a telos, a nature, a function, a set of activities intrinsic to it, 
evolutionarily determined and genetically imprinted, that constitute its 
‘living spiderness’.”152 The specific kinds of moral obligations we have 
towards animals are provided by the nature of the specific interests each 
possesses in virtue of its own telos.  He claims that: 
 
If the life of an animal has intrinsic value and should 
weighed in our moral deliberations, so too, should  
its interests, which is to say its nature or telos.   
Indeed, it is the existence of interests that makes  
something a moral object in the first place.  So I  
am now explicitly suggesting that the essence of  
our substantive moral obligations to animals is  
that any animal has a right to the kind of life that  
its nature dictates.  In short, I am arguing that an  
animal has the right to have the unique interests  
that characterize it morally considered in our  
treatment of it.153  
 
This results in basic, common sense conclusions regarding the treatment 
of animals in terms of things like not keeping birds in cages too small to 
fly or stretch their wings, but also in larger, more radical conclusions that 
challenge the uses of animals in agriculture, entertainment, and research. 
                                                
152 Ibid., p. 100. 
153 Rollin, Bernard E.  1992.  Animal Rights and Human Morality.  New York:  
Prometheus Books, p. 90. 
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To treat an animal in accordance with their telos is to respect the rights 
they have in virtue of their natures.  For example, to keep a social animal 
in isolation would be wrong, as it would violate their right, as social 
creatures, to experience the company of other animals.  To keep a bird in 
a cage, as a pet or in a zoo, would also violate the rights birds have in 
virtue of their ‘flying’ nature to fulfill those interests specific to its telos. 
Rollin admits that there are obvious problems with using the terms 
‘telos’ or ‘nature’, as it has repeatedly been abused in order to justify the 
harmful treatment of others, such as oppression of those of other races 
or genders.  But, he defends his view by pointing out the sciences we use 
in order to learn about various species, such as ethology and biology, 
allow us form accurate views on the features of various species.154  On 
this view, the increasing body of knowledge on animals and their species-
specific traits creates the opportunity for greater accuracy in our moral 
treatment of animals.  
Rollin’s argument then is twofold; first, that animals are creatures 
that are ends in themselves in virtue of having interests that matter to 
them, which can be harmed or benefited by the moral actions of humans, 
and second, that we can identify the specific ways we ought to treat 
animals by understanding their telos.  While I agree that animals should 
not be treated merely as a means to the ends of humans, using the 
concept of telos to determine the morality of our specific actions towards 
                                                
154 Ibid., p. 91-95. 
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animals is problematic in ways that Rollin does not admit to.  Although 
he admits to problems with the use of telos in the past to justify harms 
committed to various groups, he dismisses these objections by simply 
saying that we ought to be more careful when we employ the concept.   
He further claims that there are concerns about how the science is 
performed that informs us of this telos.  For, he argues, if science is 
performed dispassionately then it will ignore or deny the ‘needs’ or 
‘interests’ of animals as such.  He argues that science should be 
performed with an empathetic understanding of the natures of animals 
for it to provide us with the requisite knowledge we need in order to 
extract from it moral prescriptions.  He refers to a ‘gestalt’ shift that is 
required in order to see animals with the kind of moral value he ascribes 
to them, and that this shift is needed in science in order for it to be a 
source of knowledge concerning the telos of creatures.155  
 This raises two problems that my view on selfhood and autonomy 
avoids.  First, to require science itself, and its methods, to undergo a 
‘gestalt shift’ from dispassionate, quantitative research to empathetic 
understanding of the telos of animals is unreasonable given the 
constraints and conditions under which science is understood and 
performed.  While I appreciate the sentiment of this kind of shift in 
thinking on a large scale, it is also important to keep in mind the need for 
knowledge and research that attempts to eliminate bias for the sake of 
                                                
155 Ibid., p. 92-95. 
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greater truth.  Too much empathy or subjective influence can also have a 
negative impact on science, and can lead to results that could be harmful 
to animals as well, through such things as the wrongful interpretation of 
animal behaviours or actions.  While a certain amount of 
anthropomorphism, for example, is inevitable in science focused on 
animals, it must be carefully justified with empirical data in order to 
avoid simply mistaken or false conclusions regarding the ‘natures’ of 
various creatures.   
 Secondly, the reliance on telos as a concept that dictates moral 
behaviour is overly complicated and can detract from the more 
fundamental moral concepts that are already established.  Because telos 
can be subject to such extensive debate and criticism, it tends to lead 
people away from the more fundamental issues of why we owe animals 
moral obligations at all.  On my view, minimal selfhood and autonomy 
provide the grounds for our moral obligations towards animals, and 
these concepts are simply what we already use to understand morality in 
general.  Telos across species will be distinctly different for every animal 
we attempt to analyze, whereas minimal selfhood and autonomy are 
features that are universal to conscious creatures, regardless of species.  
Certainly selfhood and agency will manifest different behaviours and 
traits in different species, but they are shared features that simply exist 
in varying degrees across species, which provides a common ground for 
both science and morality.  Telos is much more elusive than selfhood or 
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agency, and more difficult to identify with any level of certainty.  We 
assume that all birds with wings are meant to fly, but this isn’t 
necessarily the case with all birds.  So while the concept can be generally 
helpful, there are dangers in making unsupported assumptions about the 
telos of various species that could result in the mistreatment of them, or 
in actions that could harm rather than benefit that species. 
 As a result of this problem, my view seems more plausible as there 
is more evidence and methods for investigating minimal selfhood than 
for the telos of any particular species.  As we attempt to gain an 
understanding of ‘what it is like’ for individuals of various species, we 
gain more accurate knowledge and insight into what actions will benefit 
or harm them.  My view also provides a method for evaluating the weight 
of the moral obligations we owe towards different species, as the more 
minimal sense of self would require less of us, morally speaking, than 
what we would owe to pigs, for example.  This is not clearly addressed by 
Rollin, although I suspect it would amount to a form of interest calculus 
similar to Singer’s view.156  As I have argued in Chapter Two, autonomy 
provides us with the strongest grounds for the moral consideration of 
animals, and combined with the focus on selfhood, it allows for a more 
precise guide to how we ought to treat animals than Rollin’s account. 
 
                                                
156 Tzachi Zamir refers to the ‘Rollin-Bentham’ view as a more inclusive form of 
utilitarianism based on sentience rather than just the ability to suffer.  See, 
Zamir, Tzachi.  2007.  Ethics and the Beast:  A Speciesist Argument for Animal 
Liberation.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press.  pp. 20-21. 
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Conclusion 
 Singer, Regan and Rollin provide detailed and complex arguments 
in favour of the moral consideration of animals from different moral 
perspectives.  Each view has been criticized for various reasons, and I 
have explained what I believe to be the most important of these in order 
to demonstrate how my own view attempts to overcome them.  
Utilitarianism and rights views do not seem to be as compatible with my 
own view as the focus on autonomy is lacking in them.  In chapter four, I 
will look more closely at Kantian moral theory to see how it supports my 
own view of the agency, selfhood and autonomy of animals.   
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Chapter Four:  Kantian Ethics and Animals 
 
 
Introduction 
 In chapter three, I presented three of the main positions in animal 
ethics, represented by Singer, Regan, and Rollin, respectively.  These 
positions all provide arguments and specific criteria with which to grant 
moral consideration to animals.  However, I have argued that agency, 
selfhood and autonomy provide stronger foundations for a theory of 
animal ethics than these three views.  As Kantian moral theory places 
such importance on freedom and respect for autonomy, a more thorough 
investigation of how this theory could provide support for my own view 
is warranted.  At first glance this could be seen as problematic since Kant 
himself believed that animals are only owed indirect moral duties to 
humanity, as they do not qualify as persons on his account.  Recent 
reinterpretations of Kant present alternative readings of his arguments to 
support direct moral duties towards animals, and I will argue that these 
create the best moral foundation for my own view.157 
 In this chapter I will present a brief summary of Kant’s view 
regarding animals, and a more in-depth examination of two particular 
                                                
157 There are accounts other than those by Wright and Korsgaard that attempt to 
find reasons for direct moral obligations towards animals.  While I acknowledge 
that these are good attempts, the views of Wright and Korsgaard are the most 
thorough and useful for supporting my own account.  See, Skidmore, J.  2001.  
Duties to Animals:  The Failure of Kant’s Moral Theory.  The Journal of Value 
Inquiry, 35, pp. 541-559.  Egonsson, Dan.  1997.  Kant’s vegetarianism.  The 
Journal of Value Inquiry, 31, pp. 473-483. 
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attempts, made by Wright and Korsgaard, to reinterpret his views to 
support direct moral duties towards animals.  Although not without 
problems, these two views provide an account of autonomy and why we 
ought to value animals as ends-in-themselves.  I will argue that the 
inclusion of agency and selfhood strengthens these two positions while 
preserving the integrity and consistency of Kant’s own arguments. 
 
Kant on Animals 
 
Kantian moral theory has generally been interpreted to provide an 
indirect account of moral obligations towards animals.  This means that 
animals are only morally considerable insofar as our treatment of them 
reflects on our own moral character, either cultivating cruel and mean 
behaviours or kind and compassionate ones.  We do not, according to 
Kant, owe animals direct moral obligations as they do not share with us a 
rational nature, which is the requirement for status as an autonomous, 
moral person.  Having a rational nature gives someone the status of an 
end-in-themselves, to be treated accordingly as an end and never purely 
as a means to an end.  Kant is clear that, “Beings whose existence 
depends, not on our will, but on nature, have none the less, if they are 
non-rational beings, only a relative value as means and are consequently 
called things.  Rational beings, on the other hand, are called persons 
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because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves--.”158  
Indeed, his views on animals and their proper treatment are quite clearly 
indicated in this passage.  Animals are not, according to Kant, ends-in-
themselves, and have value only as things that can contribute to our own 
moral growth as humans.  This view is clearly explained in the following, 
But so far as animals are concerned, we have no  
direct duties.  Animals are not self-conscious and  
are there merely as a means to an end.  That end is 
man…Our duties towards animals are merely  
indirect duties towards humanity.  Animal nature  
has analogies to human nature, and by doing  
our duties to animals in respect of manifestations  
which correspond to manifestations of human nature,  
we indirectly do our duty towards humanity.  Thus, if  
a dog has served his master long and faithfully, his  
service, on the analogy of human service, deserves  
reward, and when the dog has grown too old to serve,  
his master ought to keep him until he dies.159 
 
From this passage, it seems safe to say that Kant has a clear position on 
the moral status of animals as a means only and that they are only 
indirectly valuable to us through our duty to humanity.  In other words, 
we should treat animals well in order to learn how to treat other humans 
well, as it encourages us to develop respect more generally, and as we 
have a direct duty to treat other humans with respect, this is beneficial to 
our moral development. 
 However, Kant does not endorse the cruel or abusive treatment of 
animals, and makes various claims about how we ought to treat them 
                                                
158 Kant, Immanuel.  1964.  Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals.  Translated 
by H. J. Paton.  Toronto:  Harper Torchbooks.  P. 96. 
159 Kant, Immanuel.  1963.  Lectures on Ethics.  Translated by Louis Infield.  New 
York:  Harper Torchbooks.  Pp. 239-240. 
 113 
kindly and with consideration.  He states that, “We can judge the heart of 
a man by his treatment of animals.”160, and prohibits the use of animals in 
experiments without purpose or killing for sport.161  Indeed, he admits 
that animals can feel pain, and that animals can act in ways analogous to 
humans and that some of their acts “spring from the same principles.”162  
As such, we should not overwork them, and should show them gratitude 
for their service to us by treating them as members of our own family.  If 
we must kill them, it should be quickly and without suffering.163  After 
discussing why we should not wantonly destroy nature or plants for fear 
of destroying the propensity in men towards appreciating beauty, he 
says, “With regard to the animate but nonrational part of creation, violent 
and cruel treatment of animals is far more intimately opposed to man’s 
duty to himself, and he has a duty to refrain from this; for it dulls his 
shared feeling of their pain and so weakens and gradually uproots a 
natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one’s 
relations with other men.”164  The acknowledgement on Kant’s part of 
animal’s capacities for performing acts of duty, experiencing pain, 
“sensation and choice”165 is surprising given the time when he was 
writing.    
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162 Ibid., p. 240. 
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 As Kant did not believe that animals are rational, and thereby 
persons or moral agents, he advocated for indirect duties towards 
animals.  Some would argue that this is enough to get the kind of moral 
consideration towards animals that most would want, as it does require 
us to treat animals humanely and with compassion.166  However, Kant’s 
view maintains the idea that there is a distinct and categorical difference 
between animals and humans that is no longer supported by evidence, as 
I have explained in chapter one.  In what follows I will focus on two 
attempts to reinterpret Kant’s arguments as supporting direct moral 
obligations towards animals. 
 
Wright on Animals and Kant 
 Wright argues that Kant’s Formula of the End-in-itself is commonly 
interpreted to mean that, “…every rational agent is committed to taking 
rational nature as an end, and this commitment stems from the fact that 
we each necessarily view our own rational nature as an end.”167  When we 
find this rational nature in others, we must also take it as an end, and 
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 115 
this exists only in other human beings.  Wright contends that what is 
meant by ‘rational nature’ is up for debate by post-Kantians, and that 
there are three ways to interpret it.  First, there is the ‘strict autonomy 
view’, that says if someone has a rational nature they must always act in 
accordance with the moral law.  Wright rejects this option as a 
satisfactory definition of rational nature as we all know that people do 
not have fully rational natures, and that we often act on other desires or 
impulses.  And so, secondly, there is the ‘positive freedom view’ that 
suggests rational nature simply means that we have the ability to act for 
reasons that we can evaluate (according to the Categorical Imperative).  
This implies that we do not always act morally, but that we strive to live 
according to certain moral standards.  The third and final view of rational 
nature is the one Wright endorses, which he calls the ‘negative freedom 
view’.  This view requires only that someone possess the ability to make 
choices, voluntarily and with intentions.168   
Wright supports this view of rational nature as simple choice with 
textual references to Kant (the full extent to which I will not include 
here), but more importantly, with the notion that under the positive 
freedom view, children and the disabled would not be included as they 
are not capable of evaluating their own actions as moral or immoral.169  
This is a common problem for Kantian moral theory, and by endorsing 
the ‘negative freedom’ view Wright provides grounds for direct moral 
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obligations towards marginal humans and animals.  For, as he suggests, if 
the idea that animals can make choices can be supported with evidence, 
then they too possess rational nature, according to the ‘negative freedom’ 
view, and are end-in-themselves deserving of moral consideration.  This is 
because, “In the course of deliberating about what to do, everyone 
necessarily views herself or himself as able to make choices 
independently of desires or coercion.  This ability is the end of their 
actions in the sense of being a ground of action, not in the sense of being 
something produced or following from the action.  The same ability is 
manifested in others as they deliberate, and consistency requires that 
what grounds our actions must be treated with equal respect wherever it 
appears.  Consequently, we must never treat rational nature wherever it 
appears merely as a means but always as an end.”170   
This is very similar to part of Korsgaard’s argument (which I will 
examine later in this chapter) where she claims that it is the choice of a 
desired end that is more important than the consequent rational 
reflection on it, in terms of what obligates us towards others.  That is, to 
universalize a maxim into moral law, we must first make a choice about 
which end to pursue, and then rationalize it into a moral law.  But this 
does not mean the rational reflection about that choice obligates us more 
than the initial choice, as the initial choice indicates that the creature to 
which it belongs must be a creature with interests, and to whom things 
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matter (good or bad).171  It is to creatures that can make choices about 
what is good or bad for them that we owe direct moral obligations, and 
that includes animals and marginal humans, for both Wright and 
Korsgaard. 
For Wright to support his claim that animals can make choices, he 
refers to a couple of animal behavioral scientists that discuss animal 
play, use of tools, and deception.  His main claim is that scientific 
evidence provides enough support to claim that animals have the mental 
representations necessary to make decisions about goals and activities.  
He also supports the view that animals are conscious using arguments 
from evolutionary continuity and the principle of parsimony in 
interpreting animal behavior.172 He does not, however, believe it is 
necessary to show that animals are self-conscious, as he believes that 
making choices does not require it.  He argues that only at the level of 
evaluating choices is self-consciousness needed, and that if animals are 
conscious, then they are able to make choices and thus meet the criteria 
for being morally considerable.173  
He specifies that animals to be included as conscious and capable 
of making choices include higher primates, and domesticated animals 
that are kept as pets and companions.  He suggests that the ability of 
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animals we raise for food fall into a ‘grey area’ in terms of their ability to 
make choices, and says that, “Chickens seem to pursue only food and 
survival, and we seldom speak as if they choose to act as they do.  We 
should not put too much emphasis on how we happen to interpret 
animals’ behavior, but the clear cases of animals to be respected in all 
our actions are those who meet both conditions:  (1) their actions are 
easily interpreted as resulting from choices, and (2) they are conscious 
(according to our best arguments).”174He concludes his argument with 
examples of how we ought to treat animals according to his view, which 
basically amounts to treating animals as ends, and not merely as means 
to our own ends.  And so, we do not only have negative obligations to not 
hurt animals, but we are also obligated to increase the happiness of them 
and preserve their natural habitats.175 
 Wright’s account of rational nature as the ability to make choices 
preserves the strength of Kant’s Categorical Imperative and provides a 
strong foundation for valuing the autonomy of others wherever we find 
it.  On my view, minimal autonomy is similar to Wright’s ‘negative 
freedom’ view in the sense that what is morally important is an 
individual’s ability to control their own actions and pursue their own 
ends.  Although Wright does not discuss the relation between his 
conception of rational nature and autonomy in much detail, I believe that 
it is important to emphasize that autonomy should not be considered as 
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only possible through the use of rational reflection (as I have argued in 
chapter two).  To acknowledge that choice requires freedom means that 
to respect one’s autonomy one must respect and allow individuals to 
make their own choices, to the greatest extent possible.  This applies to 
both moral agents and moral patients (as Wright and Korsgaard would 
agree), which is where my own view would differ from Kant’s. 
 Wright’s dismissal of the importance of self-consciousness does 
not affect the strength of his argument as a whole, but it does conflict 
with my own view that to be conscious is to be aware of one’s own 
experiences, and means that the creature in question is self-aware, even if 
only minimally so (as I have argued in chapter one).  My own view of 
agency and self-consciousness allows for a more complex account of the 
degree to which we owe various species moral obligations, as minimal 
self-consciousness and minimal agency imply minimal autonomy.  It also 
strengthens the reasoning beyond why someone is morally valuable, as it 
is only being self-aware that someone can care about what happens to 
them.  That is, only self-aware creatures who are agents, even minimally, 
have experiences of what happens to them, which give rise to preferences 
and desires, for example, and so it is in virtue of this self-awareness that 
they can be ends-in-themselves.  Respecting the autonomy of an 
individual follows from the value of selfhood, even if only minimally, and 
Wright’s view lacks this connection. 
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Also, Wright seems to be suggesting that very few species would 
qualify for inclusion in the moral community, and he favours species that 
the average person would perceive to be able to make rational choices.  
This does not reflect an awareness of the scientific sources that include 
birds and fish, for example, along with many other species.  For example, 
just by focusing on one area of research, animal welfare science, we can 
see that chickens, pigs and cows (what Wright terms ‘food animals’) have 
clear preferences that go beyond food and survival.  To improve the 
welfare of farm animals, many studies have shown that allowing animals 
to build nests, socialize with other animals, and providing them with 
choices for living conditions demonstrates that these animals too possess 
rational natures on Wright’s own account.176  If they didn’t, the entire field 
of animal welfare science would be redundant.  As such, it seems 
conspicuous that Wright places an emphasis on higher primates, with 
whom humans are perceived to be ‘closest’ to in terms of their traits, and 
companion animals, with whom we generally have the closest emotional 
bonds.  As there is so much at stake for the animals themselves, it seems 
odd that Wright would state that we should not place too much emphasis 
on interpreting animal behaviours as conscious or as making choices.  If 
they are ends-in-themselves, or potentially so, then morally it would 
make more sense to err on the side of caution and interpret animal 
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behaviours generously in favour of consciousness and self-awareness 
rather than too stringently.   
 
Korsgaard and Animals 
Christine Korsgaard challenges the standard interpretation of 
Kant’s position on animals, saying that not only does she think it is 
possible to provide an account of direct moral duties to animals using 
Kant’s theories, but that he himself did not see the implications of his 
own argument and how it could be used to support such a position.  
Korsgaard posits that animals are also ends-in-themselves by virtue of 
what she calls their ‘animal nature’, which is also shared by humans.   
Korsgaard begins her argument by stating that her overall goal is to find 
within Kant’s own arguments the “…ground of our obligations to the 
other animals.”177  She is intent on showing that although Kant argues 
that direct moral duties are only properly bestowed on rational human 
agents as a result of their ability “…to regulate their conduct in 
accordance with an assessment of their principles…”, it does not follow 
that we have no moral obligations to animals.178  In fact, she argues that 
animals are ends-in-themselves, and thus deserving of direct moral 
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obligations based on an account of animal nature that, while reflecting 
Kant’s original definition of animal nature, reinterprets it in a novel way. 
Korsgaard gives an account of Kant’s argument regarding the 
status of ends-in-themselves as rational, human beings.  She says that the 
key characteristic of a rational end-in-itself is the legislative will.  It is 
only humans as “…rational animals, by contrast, that think about and 
therefore assess the principles that govern our beliefs and actions.”179  
She argues that for Kant, rationality means “…the capacity for normative 
self-government”.180 Kant also states that, “Because we regulate our 
conduct in this way-in accordance with our own conception of laws-Kant 
describes us as having ‘legislative wills,’… and of regulating our beliefs 
and actions in accordance with those judgments.”181  For this reason, only 
humans are ends-in-themselves, as they are the only creatures that can 
morally assess and regulate their conduct through their awareness and 
reflection on the reasons they have for acting.  As animals are not 
conscious of the principles and reasons for the ways they act, they cannot 
assess them rationally, and thus do not have legislative wills which would 
allow them to belong to Kant’s ‘kingdom of ends’.  If animals have no 
moral obligations to each other or to us, then Kant argues we have no 
obligations to them, as we cannot hold them accountable for their actions 
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as we do with other humans.182  As animals cannot enter into moral 
contracts with us, in the form of legislating moral laws, they are not 
moral agents.  Only moral agents, through their ability to reason and 
have legislative wills are worthy of direct moral consideration for Kant.  
Korsgaard questions this reasoning, arguing that although animals do not 
themselves have moral obligations183, it does not follow that we do not 
have any moral obligations to them.184 
 Although Korsgaard agrees with Kant that animals do not have 
legislative wills, and thus this cannot be “…the source of obligation”, in 
the same way humans are, she does say that it does not follow that 
animals cannot be ends-in-themselves in a different sense.  She argues 
that animals can be the source of legitimate normative claims, as they 
can obligate us.185  In the same way that Kant’s ‘passive citizens’, such as 
children and women, can obligate us “in the sense having a claim on him 
in the name of a law whose authority he acknowledges…”, we can choose 
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to will into existence laws to protect non-human animals through rational 
reflection.186 
 Korsgaard argues that, for example, we would choose to legislate 
against being tortured, hunted, or eaten, not just because these things 
would assault our autonomous, rational nature, but rather because these 
things would assault our animal nature.  Our animal nature, which of 
course is shared with other, non-rational animals, is derived from the 
notion that all animals have a ‘good’ for themselves.  This ‘good’ is 
something that the animal is aware of and strives towards, through 
pursuing those things that benefit it and avoiding those that harm it.  She 
says “For an animal has the capacity to experience and purse what is 
naturally good or bad for it.”187  Although animals cannot reflect on their 
ends as good, Korsgaard argues that,  
…an animal experiences the satisfaction of its needs  
and the things that will satisfy them as desirable for 
pleasant, and assaults on its being as undesirable or 
unpleasant.  These experiences are the basis of its  
incentives, making its own good the end of its  
actions.  In that sense, an animal is an organic  
system to whom its own good matters…We could  
even say that an animal is an organic system that  
matters to itself, for it pursues its own good for its  
own sake.188   
 
In this way Korsgaard provides an account of animal nature that both 
humans and non-humans share.  This means that we can value our 
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animal nature as an end-in-itself, which gives us a reason to extend moral 
obligations to animals as well as humans, through our legislative wills.  
She says that to the extent that we value things like eating, drinking, 
playing and curiosity, and disvalue things like pain, loss of control, and 
physical mutilation, we are valuing our animal nature.  When we legislate 
for or against these things, we are legislating on behalf of our animal 
nature.  She argues that what Kant really meant was that,  
Human beings…are not distinguished from the  
other animals by being in connection with some  
sort of transcendental, rational order beyond  
nature with which the other animals have nothing  
to do.  Instead we are distinguished by our ability  
to construct a transcendental, rational order out of  
the essential love of life and the goods of life that  
we share with other animals.189   
 
So, our moral obligations to other animals come from a shared state of 
being an end-in-itself, based on an animal nature that indicates that all 
animals pursue their own good, for their own sakes.  Humans are distinct 
from animals only in the sense that we can create value and place it on 
ourselves and others through our rational, legislative wills.  We would not 
have a rational nature or legislative will, were it not for our animal 
nature, and thus we should take our animal nature to be an end-in-itself, 
and as a reason to extend direct moral obligations to animals. 
 The claim that animal nature is an end-in-itself and Korsgaard’s 
explanation of what this means leads to a problem with her argument.  
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The idea that both plants and animals have a ‘good’ for themselves, along 
with the lack of justification for the idea that animals experience their 
‘goods’ in ways plants do not, raises questions as to how, exactly, 
humans ought to be morally obligated to animals and yet not plants. 
In her explanation of what animal nature is, she focuses on the idea 
that animals have their own goods that matter to them.  Indeed, she 
describes the kind of good that an animal has as something that it can 
“experience and pursue…”, for its own sake.190 Plants too, have their own 
goods, but not in the same sense that animals do.  Both plants and 
animals have natural goods, and they can both be said to ‘matter to 
themselves’.  While plants have goods in the sense of having needs that 
can be affected by things that interfere with their functioning, animals 
have goods in what she says is “…a deeper sense still”.191  An animal can 
experience and pursue what is good or bad for it, in a directed, 
intentional sort of way that plants cannot.  She also explains that the only 
distinction between humans and animals is the capacity for humans to 
reflect on those goods and ends, which is associated with rational nature 
rather than simply animal nature.  An animal has, as its incentives, the 
pursuit of things that will satisfy its desires, and the avoidance of things 
that are undesirable.  It is through the experience of these incentives that 
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an animal makes its own good the end of its actions, and it pursues its 
own good for its own sake.192   
In another work, Korsgaard presents this argument in a slightly 
modified way, as part of a discussion about the way we legislate moral 
laws, and how they pertain to animals.  She writes,  
The stronger way to make the argument is just to  
say that because the original act of self-respect  
involves a decision to treat what is naturally good or  
bad for youas something good or bad objectively  
and normatively, the self on whom value is conferred  
is the self for whom things can be naturally good  
or bad.  And the self for whom things can be naturally  
good or bad is your animal self:  that is the morally 
significant thing we have in common with other  
animals.  It is on ourselves as possessors of a natural  
good, that is, on our animal selves, that we confer  
value.  Since our legislation is universal, and confers  
value on animal nature, it follows that we will that  
all animals are to be treated as ends in themselves.193 
 
The idea of ‘natural good’ is what what we share with animals through 
our animal nature, and it is the source of our moral obligations towards 
them.  In her discussion of ‘natural goods’ she relies on the Aristotelian 
concept of ‘telos’ to explain what she means.  Korsgaard believes that 
animal nature possesses such goods as the interests in avoidance of pain, 
the pursuit of pleasure, etc.  But these are only valuable insomuch as they 
give rise to our rational natures, which allow us to be autonomous, moral 
agents that can legislate moral laws.  So although she is arguing that 
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animal nature is valuable in itself, it is difficult to see how she makes this 
connection.  For if animal nature is valuable as a means to rational 
nature, how can it also be valuable in itself?   
This problem is why she includes the argument of natural goods 
and telos as support for her claims.  I argued in chapter three that the 
concept of telos is ambiguous, as we are unable to provide good reasons 
for claiming that animals for plants have some kind of purpose or innate 
value specific to species.  To rely on such a concept to explain why 
animals are owed moral consideration but plants are not does not explain 
why animal nature is valuable in itself.  It would be better for her to omit 
this from her argument and focus on the idea that as conscious beings, 
animals experience things as good or bad for them.  This is the basis of 
interests that matter morally, as it means that human actions can affect 
the fulfillment or thwarting of these interests in ways that can harm or 
benefit animals.  Certainly, we can harm the interests of a plant to 
flourish, but as plants do not experience and value what happens to 
them, they are cannot be said to be autonomous, and thereby cannot be 
owed direct moral obligations. 
 Korsgaard considers the possible objection to her argument that 
only animals that have a self-concept can properly be said to be the kinds 
of things that can matter to themselves.  It is this point that raises the 
biggest challenge to her argument, and an important part of her 
argument states there is a clear distinction between rational and animal 
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nature such that animals are only morally considerable as a result of the 
legislation of their value by rational agents themselves.  The way in which 
Korsgaard has set up the value of animal nature indicates that we must 
also accept a notion of animal nature that is itself rational, which means 
that the kind of self animals have is differentiated from rational, human 
nature only by a matter of degree, not by kind.  For if the key distinction 
between animals and plants is that animals can experience their ‘goods’ 
as goods, then animals must have a conscious self-awareness, even if 
only minimally, that allows them to identify with those goods.  They must 
also be able to direct their actions towards ends that ‘matter to 
themselves’, as agents.  As such, the distinction between rational human 
nature and non-human animal nature is not one that Korsgaard can 
maintain as a result of the argument that she has made.  This is because 
animals must be able to make choices about what ends they wish to 
pursue (as Wright describes in his ‘negative freedom’ view).  In order to 
be capable of this, animals must be self-aware, at least minimally, to be 
considered conscious at all.  Clearly Korsgaard would not endorse the 
view of minimal selfhood that I have argued for in chapter one, where I 
argue that conscious experience requires self-awareness, even if in the 
most minimal sense.  However, my view makes more sense of the claim 
that conscious and self-aware animals have interests that vary according 
to the complexity of the self that they possess.   
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 Returning to the claim Korsgaard considers above, that “…some 
people will be tempted to say that only an animal with a self-conception 
can be said to ‘matter to itself’”, Korsgaard says that one problem here is 
finding a univocal definition of a self-concept.194  Granted, this is not an 
easy question, but I think the importance of pursuing this question is 
underestimated by Korsgaard, both in regards to the distinction she is 
trying to maintain between rational and non-rational beings, and to her 
goal of basing direct duties to animals based on the shared animal nature 
of humans and non-humans.  She says that the self-consciousness of 
human beings is constructed from a conception of their inner states and 
activities as being their own inner states and activities, and that this 
comes from an ability to “…situate oneself within one’s inner world, 
identify oneself as the subject of one’s own representations.”195   
As I have argued previously, animals do have minimal selfhood and 
the ability to identify with their own experiences.  There is no good 
reason to posit fully reflective self-awareness as the only form of 
selfhood at all.  Selfhood can include both rich and reflective self-
awareness and a minimal sense of ‘mineness’.  It would make more sense 
for Korsgaard to argue that animal and rational nature exist on a 
continuum, rather than in separate categories, especially as she describes 
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rational nature as ‘emerging’ from animal nature.   Korsgaard wants to 
maintain a clear distinction between the two, but this is not possible 
given that she describes rational nature as emerging from animal nature.  
Having a self-concept, if it means being self-aware, is a feature of animal 
nature that allows that animal to value (what matters to itself) and act as 
an agent based on its own beliefs, desires, and preference, etc. 
Although Korsgaard briefly entertains possible analogues of self-
awareness found among various studies performed on animals, including 
mirror self-recognition tests, the ability to respond to names when called, 
and the ability of social animals to locate themselves within a social 
hierarchy, she dismisses them as unimportant to her argument.  Her 
response to these claims is that according to the view she has already laid 
out, all animals can be said to pursue what is naturally good for them, 
and that this is the only requirement needed to make her argument work.  
She dismisses the need for a self-concept in animals as being what makes 
them directly morally considerable, on the grounds that the value 
animals have is conferred on them by us, rational human agents, and as 
such, we do not need to look for rational, autonomous behaviour in 
animals themselves in order to grant them direct moral duties.  But this 
seems to maintain a distinction between humans and animals that is 
arbitrary, and not based on the evidence of minimal selfhood in animals.  
Also, it does not explain why we should value the ability of animals to 
pursue what is good for them and to act as agents.  So instead, she says 
 132 
that it is in virtue of our shared animal nature that we can confer value 
onto animals, and that is sufficient in order to achieve her goal, without 
providing support for this claim other than arguing that it the source of 
our rational nature.196   
Korsgaard concludes from this that our actions towards animals 
would need to change quite radically, including the cessation of hunting, 
cruel experimentation, and the eating of animals.197 But this is after 
claiming that both plants and animals are similar in that they are both 
“…self-maintaining beings and in that sense are oriented toward their 
own good.”198  She does not believe that there is a clear line between 
plants and animals, in terms of moral obligations, and yet she supports a 
clear line between rational and animal nature.  In the end, her 
suggestions for how we ought to act towards animals sounds very much 
like Kant’s own view on indirect duties (with the exception of not eating 
animals).   
In a later work, Korsgaard does consider the different kinds of self-
consciousness that animals and humans have, in the attempt to clarify 
the key differences between them, and explain why animals ultimately do 
not have rational nature.  She acknowledges that animals have some 
forms of self-consciousness, in their abilities to be aware of themselves in 
space, and sometimes in their abilities to be aware of their own emotions 
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and desires.  She does not deny that animals possess various levels of 
intelligence that allow them to direct their own behaviours in accordance 
with their desires and goals.  But she denies that animals are aware of 
their reasons for acting, and argues that animals cannot provide 
justifications of their actions by reflecting on their reasons.  This is a 
result of her view of reason itself, and what it means to be rational, as 
opposed to what it means to be intelligent.  Korsgaard explains this, 
saying, 
Reason looks inward, and focuses on the  
connections between our own mental states and  
attitudes and the effects that they tend to have on  
us.  It asks whether our actions are justified by our  
motives or our inferences are justified by our beliefs.   
I think we could say things about the beliefs of  
intelligent non-human animals that parallel what I  
have said about their actions.  Non-human animals  
may have beliefs and may arrive at those beliefs  
under the influence of evidence; by analogy with our  
own case we may say that they have reasons for  
their beliefs.  But it is a further step to be the sort of  
animal who can ask yourself whether the evidence  
really justifies the belief, and can adjust your  
conclusions accordingly…Human beings have a  
particular form or type of self-consciousness:   
consciousness of the grounds of our beliefs and  
actions.199 
 
 She claims that this makes a big difference in the kind of self-
consciousness between animals and humans, in that for humans, this 
allows for normative self-government, which she believes is the essence 
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of morality and autonomy.  This means that humans are rational and 
autonomous, whereas animals are not.  Animals are thus moral patients 
rather than moral agents, and this means that only humans can will 
universal moral laws regarding our obligations towards them, as animals 
cannot do so.   
 What this means for her argument, is that although she has 
recognized that some animals are self-conscious in some ways, it still 
does not grant them autonomy or agency.  She maintains the distinction 
between animal and rational nature and maintains that our obligations 
are based on what we have in common with animal nature.  Humans have 
a rational, autonomous self, and an animal self.  We can confer value as 
‘lawmakers’ onto our own animal natures, and on the animal self found 
in non-human animals.  It is in virtue of the ‘natural goods’ that result 
from our animal natures that we are the kinds of rational creatures that 
can will moral laws into existence, and which obligate us towards each 
other and towards other animals.  However, due to the ambiguities of 
‘natural goods’, and without granting animals autonomy, the problem 
remains of how we can have direct moral obligations towards animals 
themselves if the value they have is dependent on our ‘willing’ and if 
animal nature is only valuable as a means to rational nature.  This may 
explain why her view, which she claims would radically alter the ways we 
treat animals, ends up sounding so similar to Kant’s view on our indirect 
duties regarding animals, as I posited earlier. 
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Although Korsgaard makes reference to some research on the 
mental capacities of animals in her later work, she dismisses the 
possibility that this research demonstrates rationality.  In dismissing the 
importance of research into animal minds and their cognitive abilities as 
irrelevant to her own argument, Korsgaard is maintaining a clear 
distinction between rational and nonrational nature. Extensive research 
shows however, that this line is not so easy to maintain, given the ability 
of many mammals to direct their own actions towards their goals, their 
abilities to communicate and learn language, etc. If reason is a feature of 
consciousness, then certainly there are degrees of it that correlate to the 
various levels of consciousness, agency and self-awareness.  Animals that 
are agents will be able to direct their actions towards their own goals to 
varying degrees, and the extent to which they have control over their 
behaviours will also indicate the level of autonomy that they have.  In the 
practical attempt to treat animals according to their nature, we must 
learn about their capacities through this sort of research.  And this 
research is not irrelevant to establishing an argument in favour of direct 
moral obligations towards animals, as it helps us determine the extent to 
which we owe animals obligations based on their degree of selfhood and 
corresponding degree of autonomy.  If animals possess even minimal 
selfhood and are minimally autonomous, then it is not us, as humans, 
that are placing value on them. Rather, it is in virtue of their agency, 
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selfhood and autonomy, and the importance of those features as 
determinants of moral value that obligate us towards them. 
 If we accept Korsgaard’s line of reasoning, and posit the view that 
animals do not have the same kind of self-concept that humans do, we 
are unable to get the level of normative restrictions on our treatment of 
animals that she claims. This brings us back to the idea of what it means 
to be an entity that has a good.  If plants and animals both have natural 
goods, and the only difference between them is some sort of ‘deeper’ 
sense in which animals are aware of their own goods, it is difficult to see 
how we can achieve the level of difference in the way we ought to treat 
animals as opposed to plants.  It seems that there is an important 
difference between the way in which plants have goods and the way in 
which animals have goods.  If that is true, then it would seem that we 
also need to legislate for duties towards plants, including things like the 
cessation of harvesting plants for food, growing plants for experiments 
with toxic chemicals, and the picking of flowers for our kitchen 
centerpieces.   
What I am arguing is that if animal nature is basically a 
consideration of ‘natural goods’ in living entities, and a self-concept is 
not required for direct moral consideration, then it is not clear how we 
are to distinguish between the importance of those natural goods for 
plants and animals.  If we are to be primarily concerned with ‘natural 
goods’, then are we not obligated to protect them in all living entities, as 
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we share with them the desire to have our goods met and not interfered 
with…including plants? 
 Korsgaard argues that animals have goods in a deeper sense than 
plants as they experience the attainment of their needs, and that these 
experiences are the basis of their incentives, with their own good as the 
goal of their actions.  What is significantly different here from the 
account we have of plants?  The difference seems to reside in the ability 
of animals to experience and pursue their natural goods, whereas plants 
do not.  The questions that can now be asked are, what is the nature of 
this experience for the animal, and what allows the animal to pursue 
various means to achieve its goal?  I think this is where the importance of 
a selfhood enters the picture.  An animal that can experience the 
satisfaction of its needs, and pursue the sorts of actions required to 
fulfill those needs requires at minimum, a certain level of consciousness. 
I would argue further that it requires at least minimal self-
awareness more specifically.  If animals are conscious (particularly self-
conscious) and plants are not, then it would seem that we are discussing 
a difference in kind, and not only of degree, in terms of a living entity 
that has natural goods for itself.  Besides, the kind of good that 
Korsgaard ascribes to plants is not the kind of good that would obligate 
us towards them directly.  If animals have the same kind of good as 
plants, then we would not be directly obligated towards them either.  The 
difference between the two lies directly in the self that animals possess 
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and that plants do not.  Animal nature, as Korsgaard describes it, does 
not seem valuable only in its status as a precursor to rational nature, but 
rather it is valuable in its own right.  An animal can direct its actions 
towards the fulfillment of its goods, and can also experience the 
fulfillment of these goods as pleasurable.  It can do these things because 
it is self-aware and an agent. 
I believe that in order for an animal to experience the fulfillment of 
its own goods as pleasurable, it must also have the capacity, even 
minimally, to evaluate those fulfillments, and to associate them with 
itself.  An animal that can touch the painted dot on her forehead while 
looking at herself in a mirror does know, at least minimally, that the dot 
she is touching is on her body, and not someone else’s.  An animal that 
responds to the sound of his name being called knows, at least 
minimally, that that sound relates to him, and not some other animal.   
But how does this all relate back to the necessity of a self-concept 
for direct moral duties?  When Korsgaard argues that the only 
requirement for direct duties to animals lies in the shared animal nature 
between human and non-humans, she is basing this on the idea that we 
share the same kinds of natural goods, and that we both experience the 
fulfillment of those natural goods in the same ways.  And yet, she is not 
willing to concede that humans and non-human animals share a rational 
nature, but rather that rational nature is grounded in and emerges from 
animal nature.  It seems to me that is not enough to gain direct moral 
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duties to animals, based on the notion that ‘natural goods’ for a creature 
that ‘matters to itself’ is also applicable to plants. 
 A self-concept in animals would make more sense of the idea that 
animals matter to themselves in a deeper sense than plants matter to 
themselves, as Korsgaard suggests.  But from this I would argue that 
what Korsgaard is really talking about is the existence of at least a 
minimally rational nature in animals, or at least some animals.  A full 
account of what kind of evidence we can find for associating reason with 
animals cannot be provided here, but it seems that for Korsgaard’s 
conclusions about the kinds of changes in our treatment of animals 
would require the acceptance of a minimally rational animal nature.  
Korsgaard would not be able to accept this conclusion and at the same 
time maintain the distinction in kind between rational human nature and 
non-human animal nature.  Any duties towards animals would need to be 
based on duties to animals that do not result solely from our legislation 
of them, as rational agents, but rather from the idea that Kant was wrong 
about the nature of animals themselves.   
 
Conclusion  
 Kantian ethics provides a strong foundation for the value of 
autonomy and selfhood for humans, as well as indirect duties regarding 
animals.  However, in order to reinterpret Kant’s arguments to provide 
support for direct moral duties towards animals, an argument must be 
 140 
made to include animals in the category of ends-in-themselves.  Both 
Wright and Korsgaard provide strong arguments in favour of doing so, 
even though their views have weaknesses that I have explained in this 
chapter.  For them, the ability an individual to choose an end to pursue is 
what grants animals direct moral consideration.  For Wright, the ability to 
choose redefines rational nature itself on his ‘negative freedom’ view, and 
in this way we can consider animals as ends.  For Korsgaard, it results 
from our shared animal nature, as creatures for whom ends matter, 
which includes both humans and other animals.   
While Korsgaard maintains that animals are not autonomous or 
rational, Wright considers animals minimally autonomous due to their 
ability to make choices.  My own view, which focuses on the moral value 
of selfhood and respect for autonomy, provides a better way to assess 
the extent to which we owe animals of various species direct moral 
obligations, while maintaining the principles Kantian ethics in how we 
ought to treat ends-in-themselves.  In the next chapter, I will provide a 
summary and brief discussion of how this would work in practice in our 
relationships with other animals. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Many animals, including mammals and some birds, are minimal, 
self-aware agents and autonomous beings that are deserving of direct 
moral consideration.  As research into animal minds continues, we will 
have more understanding of the specific mental capacities that give rise 
to selfhood, and this can be used to better gauge the specific ways we can 
respect autonomy in various species.  Although challenges exist in 
interpreting animal behaviours correctly to make inferences about the 
experiences that animals have, too much skepticism that results in the 
denial of animal selfhood is unwarranted.  An empirically informed 
theory of animal ethics is the best way to support the inclusion of 
animals into the moral community. 
 In chapter one, I argued for a view of agency and selfhood that is 
more or less complex, depending on the species in which it is found.  I 
supported this view with evidence from scientific research into animal 
minds, and also with arguments based on the evolutionary continuity of 
animal species.  In chapter two, I posited a view of autonomy that relies 
on agency and selfhood, and that provides us with reasons to respect an 
individual’s ability to value their subjective experiences and control their 
own behaviour.  To maintain a view that animals and humans are divided 
into separate moral categories cannot be maintained given my view of 
selfhood and autonomy.   
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 Many animal ethicists have argued that animals are morally 
considerable, but as I have argued, their theories lack an account of what 
makes all animals (human or nonhuman) morally relevant as they have 
failed to focus on the importance of agency, selfhood and autonomy in 
giving rise to interests that matter to every self-aware individual.  Singer, 
Regan and Rollin have provided accounts of animal ethics that have had 
important impacts on animal welfare and rights, but the implications of 
their views demonstrate that they are inadequate in overcoming the 
perceived divide between the moral value of human and animals.  For 
Singer, animals remain their status as resources for human use, as they 
lack autonomy and self-awareness.  On Regan’s account, the implications 
of both his high-level category of experiencing subjects-of-a-life and his 
abolitionist views result in limited inclusion of animals into the moral 
community, and an unrealistic prohibition on human-animal 
relationships.  Rollin provides more specific ways of respecting animals 
in virtue of their ‘telos’, but the problems inherent in such an ambiguous 
concept make his view impractical in practice.   
 On my account, as agency, selfhood and autonomy can exist in 
varying degrees, we are morally obligated towards animals to the extent 
that we can plausibly identify the complexity of an individual’s agency 
and self-awareness, and this applies to all animals, including humans.  As 
the view of Wise shows, this can be practically implemented using an 
‘autonomy scale’ to classify animals and the duties we owe them 
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according to the level of autonomy they possess.  This shows the 
importance of scientific research, as it provides us with the information 
necessary with which to perform such a classification.  It also means that 
autonomy is not just a human feature, although I have argued that there 
is no reason to give up a richer sense of autonomy such as Frey’s 
autonomy as control view, as long as we recognize that autonomy as 
choice is also deserving of moral respect. 
 I expanded this argument of autonomy as choice in conjunction 
with Kantian arguments that posit animals are ends-in-themselves.  
Although Wright and Korsgaard make strong arguments in favour of this 
claim, they neglect the importance of selfhood, as a feature of 
consciousness, in making animal choices possible.  While Wright would 
support my notion of autonomy in degrees, Korsgaard maintains the view 
that autonomy is only possible in fully reflective, rational agents.  
However, by arguing that autonomy as choice exists in animals, I claimed 
that animals are deserving of respect and direct moral consideration as 
ends-in-themselves, and that Wright and Korsgaard, if they acknowledged 
the evidence in support of selfhood in animals, would have to adjust 
their arguments accordingly. 
 If we include selfhood and autonomy in the discussion about 
whether or not animals should be included in the moral community we 
have created as humans, then we cannot ignore the inconsistencies in our 
current treatment of animals.  To do so would be arbitrary and irrational.  
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Although animal welfare and animal rights proponents have made 
significant improvements for the well-being of animals, my view provides 
a middle path between the two that places an emphasis not only on the 
moral importance of the interests of animals, but also on animals 
themselves, and the relationships between animals, both human and 
nonhuman.  
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